PROCEEDINGS OF THE INAUGURAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BEST PRACTICES AND NEW APPROACHES: ADAPTING DEVELOPMENT TO THE 21ST CENTURY
MARCH 20-21, 2015
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<td>Opening Remarks</td>
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<td>Plenaries by Faustine Wabwire and Tamara Arsenault</td>
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<td>Paper Presentations</td>
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<td>Paper Presentations</td>
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<td>1:00pm</td>
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OPENING REMARKS
Dr. Klara Bilgin, Dean, School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia International University

I cannot tell you how proud and happy I am to be here today. Before starting my opening the conference, I would like to say a few words about VIU and the SPIA.

This year, Virginia International University is celebrating its 16th anniversary. With 95% international students coming from over 120 countries, we have great diversity and a global perspective. Whatever happens anywhere in the world is reflected in the fates and thoughts of our students.

The School of Public and International Affairs is a very new school – we opened our doors two years ago and started with eight students – now we have 29. We offer a Master of Science in International Relations and a Master of Public Administration. Our focus is on showing best practices in American policy and politics, and we hope that our students will build their cases on and eventually use these policies as a base for building civil societies all over the world.

Now, about the conference – when we started the preparation process a year ago, we knew that we wanted to focus on the process of development, as our program centers on it. Thus, the topic revealed itself.

This year marks the target date for the eight Millennium goals, when the world takes stock of what has been achieved so far. As a reminder, the goals are:

1. To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. To achieve universal primary education
3. To promote gender equality and empower women
4. To reduce child mortality
5. To improve maternal health
6. To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
7. To ensure environmental sustainability
8. To develop a global partnership for development

As you will hear from our speakers, the world and individuals nations have done a lot to at least partially achieve these goals. We are now in search of defining the next target and finding new and innovative approaches of achieving them.

At the same time we are living in a decade that is politically very unstable and challenging. Globally, the US is slightly giving ground to China in terms of global production and political clout. Internally, our system faces political paralysis, identity cases because of racial segregation, and a slow recovery from the recent economic
depression. Our foreign policy cannot match the renewed ambitions of states like China and Russia.

The European Union is in the process of losing its cohesiveness and economic vigor. The Eastern European states are fighting their own dragons of growing corruption, mafia activity, and xenophobia. A new spree of political and economic integration is forming in the East and worst of all, we have an African continent still fighting for development and recently plagued by the spread of Ebola. The biggest challenge of all will be the region of the Middle East, where, following the Arab spring, the countries have fallen into disarray or have seen the rise of authoritarian regimes. The situation in Syria and the rise of ISIS have produced over 15 million displaced people and refugees. Caught in the middle are millions of people in need of food, housing, education, humanitarian relief and support. This, at a time when the US is facing a shrinking budget for global aid.

Given these enormous challenges, we are facing a very serious imperative to find a way to address them. We will find from our speakers how this can be done. We have 27 speakers from six different countries, and we cannot wait to hear from them. Thank you!
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We must take a moment to thank those who made the conference possible. Without the contribution of those below, the conference would not have been able to take place. Thank you everyone who helped to organize and run this conference!

DR. ISA SARAC, PRESIDENT, VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
BADAMAA YADAMSUREN, VICE PRESIDENT OF ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
PRASHISH SHRESTHA, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
DR. KLARA BILGIN, DEAN, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, VIU
KATHERINE MAGALIF, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, VIU
EDMA KHISHIGDELGER, PROGRAM OFFICER, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, VIU
DR. EMRULLAH USLU, FULL-TIME FACULTY, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, VIU
IDRIS ULAS, SCHOOL OF ONLINE EDUCATION, VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
NITESH PRADHAN, IT DEPARTMENT, VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
JUSTIN ROSEN, VIDEO OPERATOR, VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
JAMES OLA, BUSINESS AFFAIRS, VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
HASAN PARVEZ ONI, BUSINESS AFFAIRS, VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
YANNAL RAWASHDE, BUSINESS AFFAIRS, VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
CAMILLA NUNES, PRESIDENT’S OFFICE, VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
PAULETTE ZEGARRA, STUDENT VOLUNTEER, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, VIU
CHINTAN PUROHIT, STUDENT VOLUNTEER, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, VIU
THE FACULTY AND STAFF OF VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY.
THE STUDENTS OF VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY.
ALL CONFERENCE SPEAKERS, PRESENTERS AND AUDIENCE MEMBERS. THANK YOU FOR COMING!
CONFERENCE STRANDS

The conference is organized around four major strands. Proposals for paper presentations and panel discussions will be presented in the following areas:

**INDUSTRY AND ENERGY**

- Energy Access and Energy Affordability: How to Mitigate Energy Poverty in Developing Countries
- Energy Diplomacy and Energy Challenges in South Asia
- Cluster-Based Industrial Development in Kaluga, Russia
- Brazilian International Cooperation on Biofuels in Lula's Government

**CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT**

- The Role of the Military in Development: The Challenges of Alignment, Harmonization and Coordination
- Development in a Time of War: South Sudan's Renewed Conflict and Its Toll Upon Development Prospects for the Region
- The Impact of Violent Extremism on Livelihoods in Northeast Nigeria
- The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine in Libya

**21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES: FOOD, HEALTH, AND TECHNOLOGY**

- Selective Modernity: New Technologies and Persistent Cultural Attitudes in Developing Societies
- Rural Development and Food Security in the 21st Century
- The Collision of Security Challenges at National, Regional and International Scales, Environmental Public Health Governance and the Development of the CNG Industry in the Global South
• Urbanization, informal sector activities and resilience implications among the Maasai nomadic pastoralists in Dar es Salaam Tanzania

REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE EFFECT OF DIASPORAS

• Engaging Diasporas in Development
• 'Big Up Yourself My Yute!' Investigating the Impacts of Youth Majority Populations on Politics and Policy in the Anglophone Windward Islands of the Caribbean
• International NGOs and Millennium Developmental Goals Implementation: Conceptualizing NGO Characteristics in the Middle East Context
• Measuring Political Interest in Authoritarian States: The Cases of China and Vietnam

DEVELOPMENT IN CONTEXT

• The Role of Intelligences (IQ/EQ/SQ) for Organizational Development
• Conflict Prevention Norms and the Search for Sustainable Peace in Africa: a Comparative Analysis of the Invocations of Africa’s Anti-coup Norms in Mali and Burkina Faso
• Country Ownership: A Review of International Donors Perspectives on Capacity Development
• A Field Perspective: Examining Development Sectors and Reconstruction in Conflict and Post Conflict Conditions
• Developing a Global Framework for Diversity, Inclusion, and Religious Tolerance
• Development, Department of Education, Gallaudet University
• Moving Toward Human Rights for Deaf Women and Girls (video presentation)
SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
Friday, March 20th, 2015

10:15am-12:00pm  Panel I: Industry and Energy

Michael Cain, Professor of Political Science, St. Mary’s College of Maryland and Senior Energy Manager, Engility
Energy Access and Energy Affordability: How to Mitigate Energy Poverty in Developing Countries
Mariana Neisuler, Senior South Asia Energy Officer, U.S. Department of State
Energy Diplomacy and Energy Challenges in South Asia
Keunwon Song, George Mason University
Cluster-Based Industrial Development in Kaluga, Russia
Renata Ribeiro, Institute of Social and Political Studies, Rio de Janeiro State University
Brazilian International Cooperation on Biofuels in Lula’s Government

1:30pm-3:00pm  Panel II: Conflict and Development

Arthur Gibb, Permanent Military Professor, Chair, Department of Leader Development and Research, United States Naval Academy
The Role of the Military in Development: The Challenges of Alignment, Harmonization and Coordination
Justin Leach, Assistant Professor, Troy University
Development in a Time of War: South Sudan’s Renewed Conflict and Its Toll Upon Development Prospects for the Region
Ernest Ogbozor, George Mason University
The Impact of Violent Extremism on Livelihoods in Northeast Nigeria
Tahir Bushra, University of Manitoba
The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine in Libya

3:30pm-5:00pm  Panel III: 21st Century Challenges: Food, Health, and Technology

Stephen Magu, Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations, Hampton University
Selective Modernity: New Technologies and Persistent Cultural Attitudes in Developing Societies
Joshua B. Forrest, Associate Professor of Political Science, La Roche College
*Rural Development and Food Security in the 21st Century*

Tahereh Saheb, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
*The Collision of Security Challenges at National, Regional and International Scales, Environmental Public Health Governance and the Development of the CNG Industry in the Global South*

Emmanuel Munishi, Lecturer in Development Studies, Quality Assurance and Control Manager, College of Business Education of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
*Urbanisation, informal sector activities and resilience implications among the Maasai nomadic pastoralists in Dar es Salaam Tanzania*

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Saturday, March 21st, 2015

9:30am-11:00am  **Panel IV: Regional Integration and the Effect of Diasporas**

Malaika Walton, Senior Officer, Programs & Partnerships US, Cuso International
*Engaging Diasporas in Development*

Robert Chalwell, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Broward College
*'Big Up Yourself My Yute!’ Investigating the Impacts of Youth Majority Populations on Politics and Policy in the Anglophone Windward Islands of the Caribbean*

Sally Mahmoud Ashour, Assistant to the Minister for Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS), Egypt
*International NGOs and Millennium Developmental Goals Implementation: Conceptualizing NGO Characteristics in the Middle East Context*

David Owen, Assistant Professor, Department of Government and Political Affairs, Millersville University of Pennsylvania
*Measuring Political Interest in Authoritarian States: The Cases of China and Vietnam*

11:00am-1:00pm  **Panel V: Development in Context**

Dereje Tessema, Adjunct Professor, School of Business, Virginia International University
*The Role of Intelligences (IQ/EQ/SQ) for Organizational Development*
Kwaku Nuamah, Adjunct Professor, School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia International University
Conflict Prevention Norms and the Search for Sustainable Peace in Africa: a Comparative Analysis of the Invocations of Africa’s Anti-coup Norms in Mali and Burkina Faso

Randolph Adams, Adjunct Professor, School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia International University
Country Ownership: A Review of International Donors Perspectives on Capacity Development

Charles Habis, Senior Manager, International Trade and Development
A Field Perspective: Examining Development Sectors and Reconstruction in Conflict and Post Conflict Conditions

Darrell Burrell, Global Peacemaker Fellow, Claremont Lincoln University and Florida Institute of Technology
Developing a Global Framework for Diversity, Inclusion, and Religious Tolerance

Amy Wilson, Professor and Program Director of the International Development Master Program at Gallaudet University & Sarah Houge, Instructor of International Development, Department of Education, Gallaudet University
Moving Toward Human Rights for Deaf Women and Girls (video presentation)
PLENARY SESSIONS

PLENARY SESSION #1: Alexis Bonnell

“U.S. Global Development Lab: Accelerating Development Through Science Innovation and Partnership”

Alexis Bonnell is the director of the Office of Engagement and Communications in the U.S. Global Development Lab. Over her career, Bonnell has developed and delivered over a billion dollars of humanitarian and development programming in over 25 conflict, post-conflict and emergency countries, in almost every sector from education to stabilization, for more than 30 international bilateral donors, 10 U.N. agencies, the military and the private sector. She has held positions with every side of development including: implementers, donors, policy makers and beneficiaries. With more than 20 years of experience in management and communications, Bonnell has worked with: Wall Street and “dot.coms,” and on projects such as the Middle East Peace Plan, Afghan and Iraqi elections, tsunami response, Pakistan and Haiti earthquakes, over 500 construction projects, and major logistics operations. After years of working overseas, Bonnell returned to the United States with USAID as the senior adviser on business transformation and knowledge management. She then served as the chief of engagement for the Office of Education, where she helped shape the USAID education strategy.

PLENARY SESSION #2: Faustine Wabwire

“We Can End Hunger in Our Lifetime”

Faustine Wabwire, is Bread for the World Institute’s Senior Foreign Assistance Policy Analyst, based in Washington, DC. Bread for the World Institute provides policy analysis on hunger and strategies to end it. The Institute educates opinion leaders, U.S. policy makers, and the public about hunger in the United States and abroad. Ms. Wabwire provides policy leadership on global poverty, hunger, climate change, trade, and the role of effective U.S and multilateral assistance in providing solutions. She recently worked with Institute staff on the 2015 Hunger Report, which explores why women’s empowerment is essential to ending global hunger and proposed practical and achievable policy changes to improve women’s economic, political, and social status. Ms. Wabwire recently served on the Reading Committee for President Obama’s Young African Leaders Initiative (“The Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders”), a program that brings 500 dynamic young Africa leaders to the U.S. for leadership training and mentoring. She is also a member of several U.S. government taskforces on global development. Ms. Wabwire has published extensively on issues including food security, gender, agriculture, and climate change.
PLENARY SESSION #3: Tamara Arsenault

“Facilitating Citizen-Government Connections”

Tamara Arsenault has more than twenty years of international development experience, with particular expertise in municipal management, housing and urban development, program design and monitoring and evaluation. As Program Innovation Manager at Global Communities, she facilitates the replication and dissemination of innovations that create higher impact for partner communities in more than 20 countries. Ms. Arsenault organizes cross-sectoral teams that transfer innovations between countries and brings in new ideas and expertise to help local government, business and citizens work together to tackle challenging issues like climate change, poverty, water and sanitation and improved service delivery. She expands corporate and foundation partnerships, guiding strategy development and the design of new programs. Ms. Arsenault collaborated with the U.S. Green Building Council’s Center for Green Schools to internationalize the Green Apple Day of Service campaign. She has advised corporate partners like Chevron and Diageo on ways to standardize and maximize the impact of their corporate community investments. She supports the institutionalization of best practices and led development of Global Communities’ new Appreciative Review of Capacity toolkit to help organizations assess and strengthen their internal capacity.
DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN DEVELOPMENT: THE CHALLENGES OF ALIGNMENT, HARMONIZATION AND COORDINATION – Arthur Gibb

Arthur Gibb
United States Naval Academy

Author Note:
Permanent Military Professor, Chair,
Department of Leader Development and Research,
United States Naval Academy

Since 2001, the U.S. military has become increasingly involved in activities that have traditionally been the purview of development and aid agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This stems from the importance of economic and political development in other countries to U.S. national security and a foreign policy that recognizes the interrelated nature of defense, diplomacy, and development. The military brings a wealth of resources and capabilities to the development mission, but the involvement of the military in development also raises numerous concerns among aid agencies and NGOs and elicits accusations of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. The military also faces many of the same challenges faced by the aid community in delivering aid in ways that are effective and efficient. Synchronizing military development projects with those of the traditional aid community will both improve efficiency and effectiveness and help to ease the tensions and concerns that accompany the military’s involvement in these non-traditional mission areas.

Humanitarian and Civic Relief: A new military mission

The involvement of the American military in aid and development is not a new phenomenon. U.S. forces have provided humanitarian relief (HR) supplies and capabilities to victims of natural disaster around the globe for decades. High profile disaster relief missions in recent years include Sumatra following the tsunami in 2004, Pakistan in 2005 and Haiti in 2010 following earthquakes, Japan in 2011 in response to the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster, and most recently in the Philippines in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. In these and many other disaster response missions, all five uniformed services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard) have responded with ships, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, and supplies to provide logistic support and medical care to tens of thousands of victims. The military has worked closely and effectively with civilian aid agencies and NGOs in all of these efforts, but civil-military coordination and cooperation has not always been smooth. The close interaction and entrenched cultural differences have highlighted some of the difficulties the military faces as it becomes more involved in other areas of development (Abiew 2003).
A second aspect of development in which the military has a long history involves peacekeeping operations (PKO) and nation-building. From Germany and Japan following World War II to the Balkans in the 1990s to the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, post-conflict reconstruction has required the military to work closely with U.S. and international aid and development agencies in order to establish and maintain security, develop governance capacities, and repair critical infrastructure. The military’s primary function in these settings is to provide security in a hostile environment and train indigenous security forces, but they also play an important role in the other aspects of reconstruction, including providing social services ranging from medical care to garbage collection, interfacing with local leaders on issues from services to security, and rebuilding infrastructure to support a return to normalcy.

Since 2001, the U.S. military has become increasingly involved in two areas of development in which it has not previously played a significant role. One is in the provision of medical aid, assistance, and training; the other is in providing construction and engineering support for basic infrastructure. These activities fall under the moniker of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA). HCA missions are distinct from disaster relief and PKO in that they are pre-planned missions integrated into the scheduled deployment of U.S. forces, and they are conducted in permissive (i.e. non-hostile) environments. HCA missions encompass a range of objectives and capabilities, from the dedicated, three to six month deployment of a hospital ship, to visits by forward-deployed Army or Marine Corps medical teams to nearby villages, to the rehabilitation of a school by sailors from a ship making a schedule port call. The lion’s share of HCA missions are conducted by naval forces, although they are often supported by logistics, training teams, and staff personnel from all the other services. This is largely a function of the Navy’s ability to bring extensive capacity to remote parts of the world where the U.S. does not have pre-deployed or permanently stationed forces. Army and Air Force units are generally forward deployed to developed parts of the world in Europe and Asia, or to hostile environments in which HCA missions are not conducted. As such, this paper will focus mostly on naval-supported HCA missions, although the challenges, practices, and lessons discussed will generally apply to HCA missions conducted by any service in any permissive environment, as well as to disaster relief and to PKO missions in non-permissive environments.

The strategic motivation behind HCA

American forces have historically conducted very small-scale HCA missions wherever they have gone. Often referred to as COMREL, or community relations projects, these would be coordinated on an ad-hoc basis in conjunction with ship or aircraft visits to foreign countries. They were frequently coordinated by the command chaplain, were paid for out of a small pot of funds allocated to each unit for such purposes, and usually involved minor repairs or refurbishment of local schools, churches, or clinics, all conducted by volunteers from the ship or other unit. COMREL projects were always
welcomed by the local community, and provided small, tangible quality of life improvements while hopefully engendering positive press and goodwill for the U.S. forces and America in general.

The terrorist attacks in September 2001 caused a sea change in U.S. foreign and security policy with regard to the developing world. The religious and political radicalism that was now recognized as the greatest threat to U.S. national security was seen as a product of the poverty, frustration, and inequality that characterized much of the developing world. Fostering growth and development in the least developed countries (LDCs) was seen as a preemptive way to counter radicalism and improve American security. Nearly a third of the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) was devoted to strategies for economic growth and development, with emphasis on increasing aid flows, improving aid effectiveness and efficiency, improving public health capacities, and the diffusion of agricultural technologies to increase output and reduce environmental damage (The White House 2002). The importance of development to national defense was stated even more directly in the 2006 National Security Strategy:

“Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies. Improving the way we use foreign assistance will make it more effective in strengthening responsible governments, responding to suffering, and improving people’s lives…. Effective economic development advances our national security by helping promote responsible sovereignty, not permanent dependency. Weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals (The White House, 2006, 33).”

The increased emphasis on HCA missions since the release of the 2006 NSS reflects the unique ability of the military to support all three pillars of the “3D” foreign policy strategy. The Navy has responded to the new imperative with several high-profile large-scale HCA missions and a new emphasis on integrating the entire range of HCA efforts into an over-arching, cohesive strategy. Operation Pacific Partnership has completed nine HCA deployments since 2007, using a variety of large capacity platforms – a hospital ship, an amphibious assault ship, a cargo and ammunition ship, and in 2014 an amphibious assault ship of the Japanese Navy (U.S. Navy, 2014). These larger platforms have the capacity to embark large numbers of medical, engineering, and training personnel, transport heavy equipment and construction and medical supplies, and are equipped with machine shops and medical facilities. The three Pacific Partnership missions have provided medical and dental treatment to over 250,000 patients in the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, and other nations throughout Micronesia, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific. Medical teams also performed repairs and
preventive maintenance on medical equipment at local clinics, tested local water supplies, and sprayed for mosquitoes. Concurrently, military engineers, construction battalions, and volunteers embarked on these missions repaired and refurbished schools, hospitals, and clinics, improved water catchment capacities, and constructed a bridge connecting the islands of North and South Tarawa (Perez 2007; Military Sealift Command Public Affairs 2008; Harrity 2009; U.S. Pacific Fleet 2014).

Operation Continuing Promise is a similar mission serving LDCs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Deployment of amphibious assault ships USS Kearsarge and USS Boxer in 2008 and the hospital ship USNS Comfort in 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2011 provided medical and dental treatment to over 250,000 patients and veterinary care for over 28,000 animals. Embarked engineering and construction teams worked with local construction firms to build three schools and repair and renovate schools, clinics, parks, utility systems, piers, and other infrastructure (U.S. Southern Command 2007; 2009; 2010; 2011).

HCA missions were also an integral part of missions in Latin America and Africa under the Global Fleet Station (GFS) concept. Global Fleet Station is derived from the National Maritime Strategy as a comprehensive approach to helping LDCs develop their maritime security capacities, referred to as maritime security sector development. Unlike Pacific Partnership and Continuing Promise operations, the primary focus of GFS missions is providing training to maritime security forces. However, security sector development is defined broadly, and extends to a variety of stakeholders in maritime security – law enforcement, fisheries patrol, legal institutions, energy and environmental ministries, etc. – as well as to improving medical capacities. GFS missions Africa Partnership Station (APS) and Southern Partnership Station (SPS) employed amphibious ships to bring training teams and repair capabilities to countries in Latin America, West Africa, and East Africa. Development strategy took on a different form under these missions. In addition to training maritime security forces, these missions promoted inter-agency cooperation within the host government and the development of political institutions by including a broad array of maritime stakeholders in training sessions. The subordination of the military to civilian authority was a recurring theme in training seminars and workshops attended by over 1750 military officers and government officials, reinforcing the importance of strong civilian institutions. HCA was also an important secondary mission of these operations. Embarked medical, veterinarian, and engineering teams provided care and infrastructure improvements similar to that provided by the Continuing Promise and Pacific Partnership missions – the APS-09 operation conducted 16 medical outreach missions in five countries and completed seven construction projects on piers, schools, and clinics (Commander Naval Forces Africa (CNA) 2009). Annual APS missions since then have continued to expand the outreach, training, and partnership with coastal African nations.
The benefits and challenges of partnership

Critical to the success of all of these HCA missions was the emphasis on partnership – with the host country, other developed nations, and U.S., international, and local non-governmental organizations. Although these missions were U.S. led, significant effort was made throughout the planning and execution phases to include a broad range of partners in order to leverage expertise, harmonize development efforts, and align them with the stated needs of the host government. Training and medical teams from Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore participated in Pacific Partnership missions, while the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, and Spain, partnered with APS missions (CNA 2009). Independent follow-on missions by Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands have been conducted under the APS banner. U.S. efforts to broaden and highlight the international effort have been intentionally designed to blunt criticism of perceived American neo-imperialism and self-interest, but also to impress upon a wide audience the global importance of development, security, and stability in LDCs.

Partnership with NGOs has been a challenging but relatively successful endeavor so far. More than 30 NGOs have participated in these missions. Many have been related to the medical field – Project HOPE, Operation Smile, Mercy Corps, African Communities Against Malaria – while others, such as World Vision, OXFAM International, Islamic Relief USA, International Crisis Group, Rotary International, and the UN World Food Program, are geared more broadly toward development and humanitarian service (Harrity 2009; U.S. Navy Office of the Director for International Engagement (OPNAV N52) 2009). Still other NGOs partnered in areas of environmental protection (World Wildlife Fund) and veterinary care (World Vets, Veterinarians Without Borders). These partnerships brought valuable local and development expertise and experience lacking among the military participants, while the NGOs were able to leverage the Navy’s logistical, financial, and manpower resources to get their supplies and personnel to remote areas of the world.

Project Hope has been an enthusiastic partner from the beginning of these missions, and provides a good example of the synergies created by military-NGO cooperation. As part of APS-08, Navy Seabees constructed a medical clinic in Ghana, which Project Hope then outfitted with donated medical supplies and equipment. The clinic was designed jointly by the Navy and Project Hope, leveraging the latter’s expertise in clinic functionality, power requirements, etc. The NGO’s medical equipment and supplies were transported to Africa by military ships and aircraft, and the Navy coordinated with the Ghanaian military to transport it to the clinic site. Volunteers from the USS Fort McHenry joined Project Hope personnel and local medical and military personnel to set up the clinic and provide training on the specialized equipment (Commander Naval Forces Europe 2007; Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 2008).

These large-scale HCA missions have produced laudable results in terms of the direct positive effect on the poor communities into which they reached. They were not
conducted without mistakes, however, and the Navy learned the hard way many of the same lessons that others in the aid community have experienced over the years. The fact that many of these mistakes could have been avoided with more comprehensive and forward-looking early coordination with the aid and development community speaks both to the need for improvements in such coordination and the difficulties inherent in trying to do so. Each follow-on mission has been notably smoother and better coordinated than the last, but there is still a great deal of room for improvement.

**Alignment**

Much as with more traditional economic and development aid, military HCA missions have wrestled with the problem of aligning their efforts with the needs of the host country. One of the biggest challenges has been the inability to accurately assess what host country needs and priorities actually are. Military planners are required to conduct much of the initial and follow-on contact with the host nation through the Defense Attaché (DATT) office within the U.S. Embassy. Unfortunately, embassies in Africa are notoriously understaffed, and often service more than one country. During initial efforts to plan and coordinate these missions, the DATT and embassy country team sometimes became a debilitating choke point, because the mission was being driven by the Combatant Command headquarters and not by requests from the country team. Planners were pushed by their chain of command to come up with specific objectives, but could not get such information and feedback from the country teams, and were not allowed to approach the host nation directly. So initial planning was based on staff-level assumptions about needs and capacities. When direct coordination with the host nation was finally achieved, there was a sense that the U.S. was telling the host nation what it needed, which was not always well received. Often, the host nation did not have a plan that addressed the kinds of projects and assistance being offered, and so needed more time than was available to study the question. This led to projects that were either not aligned with host nation priorities, or frantic last-minute changes to better meet those priorities.

Follow-on missions have built on the lessons learned and contacts made in earlier missions. Embassy teams, protective of their relationship and the U.S. reputation with the host nation, have overcome initial skepticism about these missions and have devoted more effort and resources to the early planning and coordination phases. Planners have a better understanding of the existing needs and capacities, and have developed personal contacts through which they can better conceptualize mission objectives in the early planning stages. Perhaps most importantly, initial planning conferences have been moved forward to allow more time before the mission, and host country representatives have been eager and welcome participants from the earliest stages. Feedback from successive APS mission noted significant improvements to both construction projects and medical outreach programs as a direct result of better joint planning and pre-arrival coordination (CNA 2009).
Harmonization/Interagency Coordination.

Ironically, while an important pillar of security sector development is helping host nations to strengthen government institutions and improve communication and cooperation between government agencies, HCA missions have repeatedly demonstrated how difficult interagency cooperation is to effect, even by advanced Western democracies. Coordination between the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), and USAID was demonstrably lacking in early missions in 2006 and 2007. Although certainly beneficial to recipients, HCA projects were generally conceived, planned, and executed without regard for and uninformed by existing host nation and/or USAID development plans. This was partly due to the often rapidly evolving nature of the mission, but also to competing objectives, different bureaucratic cultures, parochial interests, and entrenched biases which hampered the efficiency and effectiveness of HCA missions. This does not mean that interagency cooperation has been nonexistent; State and USAID have generally been represented at planning conferences, and have been invaluable at facilitating communication with their personnel in host countries and embassies. Both agencies have also had personnel actively participating in the HCA missions, and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has been involved in collecting data on currents and weather patterns which can aid fisheries development. The problem has been that existing coordination is happening ad hoc, based on personal relationships and interests, and takes the form of DOD planners reaching out to include State and USAID in planning that is driven from DOD’s perspective and by DOD priorities. As one staff member of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) observed,

“We are not actively supporting USAID strategies or projects in any significant way... we've done very little (if anything) to systematically support broader development objectives; and our interagency coordination methods are essentially business as usual.... [W]hen we are essentially embarking on state-building (or state-supporting) [missions] we must simply place development at the forefront of the strategy and use diplomacy and security (defense) – the other two D’s – to support an overall development strategy [emphasis in original] (Anonymous 2010b).”

In 2010, the Navy appeared to be taking steps to address this weakness. An draft instruction acknowledged the critical role of USAID, and directed that “[t]he Navy will seek to integrate its short-term, high impact capability into, or provide parallel support for, USAID’s existing development assistance projects within the context of a larger country plan (Chief of Naval Operations 2010).” Unfortunately, the instruction was never finalized and signed, most likely a victim of high-level leadership turnover and shifting priorities. However, USAID and the various Combatant Commanders did take steps to facilitate better coordination by creating liaison billets both on the military
staffs and at USAID headquarters in Washington, and a senior Marine officer was assigned to the U.S. Institute for Peace, but it will take time for such a paradigm shift to really take hold. As it is now, much like elsewhere in the development world, there is often a disconnect between the senior leadership and the action officers on the ground and in the field. A report prepared by the Center for Naval Analysis, a Washington-based think-tank that supports the U.S. Navy, observed that “high-level guidance has not yet been translated into an accepted set of procedures” for coordinating with other government agencies and with NGOs (Lawlor, Kwast, and Kraus 2008, 3). Additionally, organizational pressures to demonstrate results and effectiveness to the chain of command create a division between senior leaders at upper echelon commands and the staff members and troops taking part in the mission on the ground. One veteran of three APS operations observed

“...[People] in the field appreciate partnership projects because they acknowledge the reality and complexity of what it takes to earn success on the continent. ...people in Stuttgart [AFRICOM] and Naples [Commander Naval Forces Africa] are faced with opposite pressures – how do you make projects look slim and organized, preferably in four bullets or less, for the senior leadership? It’s a lot easier...than it is to confront the complex social issues that have made so many African bureaucracies completely dysfunctional (Anonymous 2010a).”

Cooperation with NGOs.

Building cooperation between the military and NGOs has been by far the most productive and beneficial aspect of recent HCA missions, but it has also been the most challenging. Working with NGOs has unquestionably improved the effectiveness of HCA missions by allowing the military to leverage the manpower, expertise, and experience of the NGOs (Lawlor et al 2008). One of the most important assets NGOs bring to the HCA mission is experience with capacity-building that can help avoid unintended negative consequences, something with which the aid community is unfortunately well acquainted (Easterly 2001; Moyo 2009). Additionally, military personnel generally lack training specific to the humanitarian mission, as well as language skills and cultural awareness (Abiew 2003; Lawry 2009). NGOs help to fill these crucial gaps and to avoid costly blunders by well-intentioned but inexperienced military personnel.¹ From the perspective of the NGO, the military brings with it a tremendous capacity for logistics

¹ A somewhat humorous but no less damaging example of good intentions gone array is a story about the U.S. military handing out soccer balls to kids in Afghanistan. The balls were imprinted with various national flags – including that of Saudi Arabia – to convey a sense of international peace and friendship. Unfortunately, the Saudi flag contains a verse from the Holy Koran and the name of Allah, neither of which should ever come in contact with the human foot. The goodwill effort was taken as an insult to Islam and led to protests and condemnations by influential local mullahs (Leithead 2007).
and communications that can improve the efficiency of aid delivery and help the NGOs achieve their objectives. The military also possesses financial and manpower resources that dwarf those of most NGOs, but which can often be applied to specific NGO objectives and priorities through coordination and cooperation.

The challenges to cooperation with NGOs, however, have been, and continue to be, significant. They are both numerous, and, in some cases, imposing; three are particularly daunting – philosophical differences, security and neutrality concerns, and operational barriers to coordination.

By far the most significant challenge to cooperation for many NGOs is a fundamental philosophical difference with the political nature of military involvement. Many NGOs and NGO personnel adhere strictly to a humanitarian imperative based on principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality (Abiew 2003, 10). As such, they are committed to a principle articulated in the International Red Cross Code of Conduct that aid should not be used to further political objectives (OPNAV N52 2009). As one official from OXFAM explained, NGOs see military HCA missions as being “driven by donors’ political interests and short-term security objectives” and believe they are “often ineffective, wasteful, and potentially harmful (Abrams 2010).” Others believe that the military goals and objectives do not integrate well with their humanitarian principles (Lawry 2009, 195). In point of fact, they are not altogether wrong, at least with regard to the political nature of the military’s involvement. Guidance for HCA missions found in national strategy documents, DOD directives, and official Navy instructions make it clear that HCA missions are intended to further U.S. foreign policy interests, support deterrence, stability and interoperability, enhance credibility, and promote American influence and access (Lawlor et al. 2008, 24). NGOs find evidence of this in the selection of missions and sites that are perceived to be selected based on political or strategic objectives, rather than on need. Even more problematic, although press releases and public statements by Navy officials stress the military’s commitment to aid and development for its inherent benefits to the host nation, as well as its strategic ones, official guidance states specifically that the Navy conducts HCA missions

“primarily to train its personnel and secondarily to forge working relationships with the NGO, Joint, Interagency, and International communities in times of calm so that our collective response to crises will be more effective (Chief of Naval Operations 2010).”

While such language is required in order to comply with congressional mandates that delineate the respective roles of DOD and DOS and set restrictions on the use of military assets, it is easy to understand how it leads to skepticism and cynicism on the part of NGO personnel (as well as host nation governments), especially given that many aid workers are culturally and organizationally predisposed to distrust authority in general and the military in particular (Abiew 2003, 14). Such distrust is evident among
some NGO personnel who feel that the military has not clearly articulated why it wants to partner with NGOs, giving rise to the suspicion that NGOs are being manipulated to support ends that are in conflict with their humanitarian principles (Lawlor et al. 2008, 8).

To some extent, this tension is easing as trust and understanding are built through recurring cooperation across the spectrum of humanitarian operations. Despite the intensity of OXFAM’s objections in the above quote from 2003, OXFAM has been an important partner in several HCA missions since 2007, and was represented at a conference held in November of 2009 specifically intended to improve cooperation between the Navy and NGOs. The participation of over 30 NGOs in that conference and various HCA missions demonstrates that at least some organizations have recognized the synergies that can be exploited by cooperating where there are shared objectives, even if the underlying motivations are different.

A second and maybe equally imposing barrier to military-NGO cooperation is the fear among NGOs that working with the military can create perceptions that undermine their neutrality and impartiality, and in doing so, increase the risk to NGO personnel, especially when working in non-permissive environments. The effectiveness of NGOs is due at least in part to the trust their personnel develop with locals through sustained interaction and cooperation. If cooperation with the U.S. military calls into question their neutrality and independence, it undermines their hard-earned trust and their effectiveness. In non-permissive environments, this can cause NGO personnel to be seen as legitimate “enemy” targets, and can put their lives and missions at risk, an unfortunately ironic effect of military forces trying to provide security for NGO personnel (Abiew 2003, 15). The targeted killing of over 35 NGO personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2002 and 2005 is a sad testimony to this effect (Scheidt 2005, 9). Even in permissive environments, the fact that HCA projects get widely publicized by the military and U.S. government in order to capitalize on the goodwill that they can generate can deter NGOs from wanting to participate. While the civil-military cooperation is seen by the military as a positive and is intended to help “de-militarize” perceptions of HCA operations, NGOs generally prefer to keep their image as independent as possible (Lawry 2009, 194). According to InterAction, an umbrella organization representing a large coalition of U.S.-based NGOs, such publicity can reach far flung audiences and affect NGO missions both locally and in other parts of the world, calling into question their neutrality or putting them at risk because of their association with the U.S. military (OPNAV N52 2009). At least one NGO experienced this backlash when Angolan rebels questioned their impartiality and refused to work with them after seeing reference to their cooperation with NATO forces in the Balkans (Abiew 2003, 15).

Beyond jeopardizing the lives and reputations of NGO personnel, there is concern that in a non-permissive environment, partnering with the military can put the mission itself at risk. The head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated
his concern that if “aid is being delivered as part of a military strategy, the counter-
strategy is to destroy that aid (Abrams 2010).” The possibility that the food or medical
supplies themselves could become the target of warring factions is disturbing to NGOs,
but it extends beyond simply supplies. The American experience in Iraq offers numerous
examples of anti-American insurgents destroying critical infrastructure, schools, and
clinics built by American and coalition forces (Fink 2005; Klein 2010).

Unfortunately, there is little either the military or the NGOs can do to resolve or mitigate
this particular side-effect of cooperation; ultimately it is a function of perception by
multiple audiences around the world. While the risk seems manageable in permissive
and low-threat environments like Latin America and most of Africa, the fact that
audiences in hostile environments are exposed to the same images means that NGOs
worried about the safety of their personnel everywhere in the world have to be
cconcerned about cooperating with the military anywhere in the world. Even in situations
where they might benefit from cooperation, concerns that short-term benefits are
outweighed by unforeseen long-term consequences for NGOs with sustained missions
throughout the world will cause many NGOs to choose not to partner with the military

A third set of challenges can be aggregated under the heading of coordination issues.
These range from something as mundane as differing terminology to something as
fundamental to operations as organizational structure and hierarchy. NGOs bristle
when military planners and documents refer to them as “force multipliers,” and object
to the use of the term “humanitarian” on the grounds that its association with military
operations can undermine the connotation of impartiality and neutrality that the aid
community has worked tirelessly to establish (Lawlor et al. 2008, 73). The use of both
terms is seen to increase the risk to NGO personnel that accompanies being associated
with the military. Even the word “coordination” has caused problems; to NGOs, it
implies “meeting or talking and sharing information,” while to military personnel it has
command and control implications (Lawry 2009, 186).

Information exchange is an important aspect of cooperation, and critical to getting the
right assistance to the places and people most in need. But an inherent part of all
military operations is the gathering of intelligence. This does not have to mean secret
or sensitive information about military capabilities; intelligence includes anything that
can help military planners and civilian foreign policy makers better understand the
cultural and political dynamics of a host nation. This same information is important to
delivering aid effectively, and is something in which NGOs are particularly well-versed,
but the line between the military’s desire for that information for mission
accomplishment and for intelligence reporting can be fuzzy, and NGOs are very wary of
sharing information if it can be construed as them being complicit with the military in
gathering intelligence (Scheidt 2005, 15). Even in non-permissive environments, this
concern is compounded by the same factors discussed above with regard to the ripple
effects elsewhere in the world of association with the military.
Another coordination issue is communications equipment and infrastructure. NGOs often lack substantial communications capacities, something the military has in abundance. Cooperation gives NGO personnel access to military networks and equipment and greatly enhances their ability to communicate, but comes with some sacrifice in autonomy, something they guard zealously. They must abide by military communications procedures and accept the fact that their internal communications can be monitored by the military. Similarly, the military can provide NGOs with robust logistics support that would be unavailable otherwise, but NGOs often become frustrated when their supplies or personnel are bumped for something deemed higher priority by the military, or when aircraft or ships become suddenly unavailable due to changes in operational tasking or maintenance issues. Such decisions are often made at fairly high levels in the military chain of command, but they undermine the trust and personal relationships that commanders in the field work hard to build with NGO personnel.

Finally, the vast divide between the organizational culture of the military and that of the NGO community can frequently cause tension and frustration and inhibit the effectiveness of aid delivery by both sides. Military HCA missions are based on a clearly delineated chain of command, a commonly understood set of objectives, an acceptance of rapidly-changing guidance and mission parameters, an emphasis on force protection, and an aversion to costly and politically charged sustained involvement. NGOs, on the other hand, differ widely in their degree of centralization, organizational structure, and willingness to work in dangerous environments, and most require substantial lead time for planning, fundraising, and identification of personnel, and are committed to the long-term sustainability of their projects (Scheidt 2005, Lawlor et al. 2008, Lawry 2009). The lack of homogeneity among NGOs can make coordination with them extremely frustrating for military personnel used to working under established and standardized procedures, as can NGO personnel’s determination to maintain their autonomy and independence in the face of the military’s perceived efforts to organize things according to their rules.

Conclusion

The role of the military in development is only likely to increase in the coming years. Continuing tensions and hostilities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria and the associated humanitarian crises, the increased importance of stability in developing nations to U.S. national security, and international response to natural disasters will all require the tools and talents of the military and cooperation with the aid community. The implications of this reality are many, both positive and negative. The involvement of the military will enable aid and aid workers – both military and civilian – to reach remote places and communities with the supplies and personnel to make a real difference to the lives of impoverished people. American military cooperation with foreign militaries,
governments, and NGOs will undoubtedly break down stereotypes and generate goodwill for the U.S. Perhaps most importantly, aid delivery by the military and their partners will continue to improve in both efficiency and effectiveness as lessons from working together are institutionalized and incorporated into the planning and execution of future missions.

HCA missions particularly will continue to be controversial, however. Perceptions of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, security and neutrality concerns of NGOs and other aid agencies, and interagency rivalries and turf battles between DOD, State, and USAID are all issues that policy makers and military leaders alike will be forced to contend with and resolve. Other issues – the role and implications of AFRICOM, the trade-offs made by the military in terms of fighting readiness, the need to increase the capacity of the State Department – are beyond the scope of this paper, but are integrally related to the extent and effectiveness of military-led development in the future.

In the near-term, however, all indications are that the efforts made by the military over the last decade to partner with non-military government and civilian agencies and organizations are already producing better synchronization, harmonization, and alignment, all of which are benefitting the ultimate recipients of U.S. development aid. Recently-completed and scheduled future HCA missions in Africa, Latin America and the Pacific all reflect increased participation by foreign militaries, host nation governments, and international NGOs and aid agencies. Coordination problems will continue to pose a challenge to these partnerships, but there is a growing sense on all sides that these coordinated efforts benefit everyone and increase each organization’s ability to effectively achieve its objectives.
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THE IMPACT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM ON LIVELIHOODS IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA –
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Abstract

The effect of violent extremism on livelihoods and the resilience of communities are relatively understudied. This paper addresses three key questions: What is the root cause of violent extremism? What are the effects of extremism on livelihoods? And what are the livelihood strategies for coping with extremist activities in Northeast Nigeria. Using the desk research technique, review of secondary information from sources such as journal articles, reports, and the media. This study contends that the drivers of Boko Haram include socio-economic and ideological variables; and the effects of extremism on livelihoods have both direct and the indirect impacts. The study concludes, recommends’ the application of the sustainable livelihood framework (SLF) in assessing the strategies employed by communities to cope with extremist violence. This approach investigates sensitive issues in an insecure environment by asking questions about how people live.

Key Words: Impact, Extremism, Livelihoods and Nigeria
Introduction

The effect of violent extremism on livelihoods and the resilience of communities are relatively understudied. Although, recent scholarships have attempted to explain the economic impacts of extremist activities in developing countries, but the case of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria remains unexplored. This paper attempts to analyze the impact of extremism on livelihoods, with particular reference to Boko Haram’s case in Northeast Nigeria. The questions address is: What is the root cause of violent extremism? What are the effects of violent extremism on livelihoods? And what is the livelihood strategies for coping with extremism in Northeast Nigeria. This study employs desk research technique; review of relevant literature from sources such as journal articles, reports from local and international organizations and the media. Beginning with the definitions of the key concepts used in this paper, the other issues covered are: the drivers of Boko Haram, the direct and indirect effects of insurgencies, and the livelihood strategies for coping with extremism.

What is Violent Extremism? According to Holmer (2013), the term violent extremism means different things in different contexts. The Australian National Counter-terrorism Committee Framework defines violent extremism as "a willingness to use or support the use of violence to further particular beliefs, including those of a political, social or ideological nature" (cited by Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011:9). Neumann et al. (2011:16) defines extremism as political ideologies as well as a method that oppose a society’s core values and principles. Borum (2011) contends with this definition but asserts that it could be applied to an ideology that advocates the religious supremacy and opposes the core principle of democratic governance and human rights. These definitions of violent extremism emphasize the use of violence to further religious ideologies, political or social goals.

According to Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway “Livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims, and access) and activities required for a means of living...” (Chambers and Conway, 1992: 7). The Department for International Development (DfID) also define livelihood “as the means by which households obtain and maintain access to the resources necessary to ensure their immediate and long-term survival” (DfID, 1999). However, in relation to conflict in particular, Young et al. (2002) said that livelihood consists of the ways people access and mobilize resources for their survival and longer-term well-being, and hence reduce the vulnerability created and exacerbated by conflict. These definitions agree that livelihoods entail the capabilities, assets and strategies that people use to pursue their survival.
To sum up, the terms violent extremism and radicalization are often used interchangeably, but they do not mean the same thing. Newman (2011) and Borum (2011) captured the difference between violent extremism and radicalization; radicalization is a process, whereas violent extremism is an action taken. More so, in the context of this paper, the definition by Young et al. applies; it focuses on the vulnerability and shocks created and exacerbated by violent conflict.

**Causes of Violent Extremism**

The theories that have been used to explain the causes of terrorism and violent extremism include the failed state theory (LeFree et al., 2008), rational choice theory (Eager, 2008), root cause theory (Newman, 2006), relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970), basic human need theory (Burton, 1997), and others. However, Schmid and Jongan points out that these theories are like other social science theories, reflections on the types of debate and conversations that are occurring in the discipline and not a formal proposition that have been empirically and conclusively tested (cited by Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011:10). Hence, these theories are not devoid of gaps and limitations. Few of these theories are discussed below.

According to LeFaree, there is a correlation between state failure and terrorism (cited by Sandole, 2010:105). The fail state theory according to Sandole (2010:105) is a conceptual repository on multiple variables such as poverty, corruption, and unemployment that makes an environment conducive to terrorism. This theory has been applied to explain terrorism in some countries classified as a failed state, for example, Somalia (David, 2013). However, this theory is inadequate in explaining the motivation of terrorism in countries that did not fall into the failed state category. The rational choice theory is often used to explain the economic motivation for participation in terrorism. According to Eager (2008), involvement in terrorism is often based on the assessment of the cost and benefit; if the benefit is high, individuals participate. However, the flaw in this theory according to Eddine et al. (2011:10) is when the group behavior is compared to individual choice. Eager (2008) maintained that whether or not an individual participates in-group action they could still benefit, thus becoming a ‘free rider’.

Most scholars cited the root cause theory and the relative deprivation theory as more relevant to the explanation of the socio-economic causes of terrorism. According to Newman (2006), there is a causal relationship between the underlying social, economic, political and demographic conditions and terrorist activities. Newman (2006:751) further adds, factors such as poverty, social inequality, exclusion, and political grievance, are the independent variables on which the emergences of terrorist organizations are dependent. Sandole (2010:107) also add that terrorism may be a manifestation or a
symptom of deep-rooted origins of political violence. More recent literatures have also emphasized the significance of understanding and addressing the underlying causes of violent extremism (Denoeux and Carter, 2009); as an effective preventive measure.

The relative deprivation theory is a belief that individuals or group are deprived of socio-economic resources compared to others. Gurr (1970) argues that people become dissatisfied if they feel that they have less than they should and could have, and over time; such dissatisfaction leads to frustration, anger and then rebellion. Gurr (2005: 20) concludes that structural poverty and inequality in some countries are the breeding grounds for violent political motivated movements in general and terrorism in particular. The basic human need and relative deprivation theories were cited by many scholars as relevant in explaining the socio-economic inequalities and disparities in Nigeria that has led to the emergence of Boko Haram.

However, there are several approaches to understanding the causes of political violence, terrorism and violent extremism – political, psychological, psychosocial and socio-economic approaches (Crenshaw, 2010). The socio-economic causes has generated interesting debates, particularly on the link between poverty, education, and terrorism. According to Mesoy (2013:2), the debates on the relationship between poverty and terrorism can be categorized into three groups: "No link" (Kreuger, 2007; Piazza, 2006), "weak link" (Hegghamer, 2010; Wiktorovicz, 2004) and "link" (Seddon and Hussein, 2002; von Hippel, 2009). These different categories represent the divergence of opinions on the issue of the relationship between terrorism and poverty.

On the link between poverty and terrorism, James Piazza (2006) assessed the hypothesis that poverty, inequality and poor economic conditions were the root causes of terrorism using a quantitative study of 10 countries cases. He found that there were no correlation between economic development and terrorism. Piazza study shows that factors like ethno-religious diversity and state repression were important determinants of terrorism. Piazza’s study agrees with the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on US Report 2004 "Terrorism is not cause by poverty" (cited in Krueger, 2007:3). Krueger (2007) used data from public polls and the US counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to support the position that terrorism is not caused by poverty and low level of education. Krueger (2007:89) also maintains that “civil liberties are an important determinant of terrorism.” Thus, Piazza (2006) and Krueger (2007) main argument is that poverty and low-level education does not correlate with terrorist activities.

Contrarily to Krueger and Piazza, in the case of Maoists insurgency in Nepal, Seddon and Hussein (2002) found that the failures of the ruling government created the pre-conditions – poverty, inequality and social discrimination that led to widespread discontent, and ultimately Maoist insurgency. Additionally, von Hippel (2004) uses the
cases of Somalia and Pakistan, where young people have been recruited to join extremist groups in poor communities to argue that the poor can be lured to terrorist believes. According to von Hippel (2004), terror groups can offer social services that the governments cannot provide thereby attracts support from the poor and alienated populations. The main argument by Seddon and Hussein (2002) and von Hippel is that there is a correlation between poverty and terrorism, particularly in poor communities.

Hegghammer (2010) neither agree with Krueger (2007) nor von Hippel’s positions as expressed above. His study shows that most members of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia were from the middle class and not poor backgrounds or elites in the society. De Mesquita (2005b) also argued that terrorist organization recruitments are based on terrorist ability. According to de Mesquita “Better educated people make better terrorist”, he concludes that there is a positive correlation between socio-economic status and terrorist activities. These different opinions make the debate on the relationship between terrorist activities and socio-economic conditions interesting but inconclusive.

In an attempt to provide an explanation for these different opinions, Tom Parker explains that terrorism and violent extremism come in many forms and has multiple and overlapping causes and therefore poses tremendous challenges for explanation (cited in USIP, 2014). Sinai (2007) also argues that the root causes are dynamic, fluid and constantly changing. These attributes, therefore, makes the explanations of the underlying causes difficult. Gurr and von Hippel suggested a way forward to the explanation of the relationship between socio-economic conditions and terrorist activities. According to von Hippel (2004), local contexts and groups must be studied individually in order to avoid complexity. Gurr, (2005: 19) also asserts that “terrorism today has local and transnational costs, thus, requires coordinated local, national, regional, and global policy responses.” Based on these assumptions, it can be argued that explaining the underlying causes of terrorism is complex but Gurr and von Hippel suggested approaches to manage the complexity.

The Causes of Boko Haram’s Violence in Northeast Nigeria

From a historical perspective, Falola and Heaton (2008) said that Nigeria’s recent troubles could be explained through an examination of the history of its pre-colonial (pre 1900), colonial (1900 – 1960), and post-colonial (1960 to date) periods. These periods in the Nigeria’s history are critical to understanding the current dynamics of political, economic and social issues in the country (Falola and Heaton, 2008). In line with this, Tsogo (2011) used historical narrative to show that Nigeria is vulnerable to violent religious extremism based on a long history of ethno-religious violence in the country. The Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 to 1985 were the first major manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria (Adesoji, 2011). Isichei (1987) also notes that over 4,179
people were killed during the Maitatsine conflict that lasted for about 5 years. Let’s turn to the socio-economic challenges in Nigeria in relation to the fundamentalist Islamic movement in the country.

**Socio-Economic Issues in Nigeria**

In mid-2014, Nigeria rose to become the biggest economy in the African continent and the world’s thirteenth largest crude oil producer (The Economist, 2014). Presently, the Nigeria’s economy currently has a gross domestic product of over $500 billion per annum, and a stable economic growth rate of 7 percent (Premium Times, 2014). However, Nigeria is a delicate state; its economy is entirely dependent on the exports of oil and gas (ICG, 2006:1). According to Peter Lewis, the continued reliance on the petroleum revenues as the sole export commodity makes the country vulnerable to economic shocks (Lewis, 2011:1). The International Crisis Group (ICG) also added that a failure to diversify the economy of the country also exposed the country to “a development trap” (ICG, 2006). More recent studies also emphasized that Nigeria’s economy is growing due to the abundant oil resources, but poverty and other socio-economic problems are prevalent in the country.

To the Council on Foreign Relations (CfR), Nigeria's economy is growing, but the standard of living is falling in reverse order (CfR, 2014:16). According to CfR, 64 percent of Nigeria's population is categorized as living under the poverty level, with an estimate of 73 percent poverty rate in the rural areas (CfR, 2014:6). Poverty affects more than half of Nigeria's population, despite the abundant oil wealth, a malaise ICG (2006) referred to as “want in the midst of plenty”. The ethnic and religious unrest and the Boko Haram’s insurgency in Nigeria are manifestations of the falling standard of living and structural disparities between North and South regions of the country (CfR, 2014:4). According to McLoughlin and Bouchat (2013), the centrifugal forces that have acted against Nigeria’s unity and the centripetal forces that have kept it together are not properly understood and are rarely examined. This brings us back to what Paden (2009:3) said earlier that Nigeria is the least understood among the Muslim world pivotal states. A pointer to the need for further investigation on the alleged link of the level of poverty in Nigeria to the Boko Haram insurgency, despite the economic potentials of the country.

Nevertheless, there is also a need to reconcile the alleged link of Boko Haram to poverty and the falling standard of living in the country with the ideological statement by Osama bin Laden in 2003. The deposed leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Ladin, in a translated speech by the Associated Press (2013) said:
“I also assure those true Muslims should act, incite, and mobilize the nation in such great events, hot conditions, in order to break free from the slavery of these tyrannic and apostate regimes, which are enslaved by America, in-order to establish the rule of Allah on Earth. Among countries ready for liberation are Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, the country of the two shrines (Saudi Arabia), Yemen and Pakistan” (Osama bin Laden, 2003, cited in AP 2003).

Nigeria was one of the countries mentioned by the late al-Qaeda leader to be ready for Islamic liberation in sub-Saharan Africa. More so, Boko Haram (also known as Jama’atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda’awati wal - Jihad) emerged as an Islamic splinter group in 2002 (Meehan and Speier, 2011), shortly after 9/11 and the start of the global war on terror (GWOT).

These different views from economic and ideological standpoints illustrate the complex nature of the explanation of the causes of Boko Haram. Onapajo (2012) said that the explanation of causes of Boko Haram’s is complicated due to the group’s shadowy sponsors. Also, there is a need for an explanation about the economic growth that Nigeria had experienced in the last 5 years in spite of the Boko Haram’s insurgency. According to Meierrieks and Gries (2013:91), “the causal relationship between terrorism and economic growth is apparently complex”. The unexpected rise in Nigeria’s economy despite the insurgency contradicts Meierrieks and Gries (2013) finding that in a post-cold war era terrorism is detrimental to growth for African and Islamic countries with low level of political openness, high level of political instability, and strong terrorist activity. They reached the conclusion through an analysis of the causal relationship between terrorism and economic growth using panel data. Let us turn to how these theories have helped or failed to help us to understand the Boko Haram insurgencies.

**The Root Causes of the Boko Haram Insurgency**

There are several explanations about the causes of the Boko Haram uprising; ranging from political statements to theories and empirical studies. In February 2012, the past Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Sanusi Lamido said that structural imbalance” between the north and south of Nigeria was responsible for the violent conflict in the northern part of the country (The Punch, 2012). In line with this view, Herskovits (2012) also asserts “the underlying cause of violence and anger in both North and South of Nigeria is endemic poverty and hopelessness” (The Vanguard, 2012). A former American President, Bill Clinton adds, “Poverty remained the primary driver for the attacks by Boko Haram and needed to be addressed by strong local and Federal Government programmes” (The Punch, 2012). Mr. Jonnie Carson, former American under Secretary for Africa concludes that the only way out of the trap of Boko Haram is for the Nigerian government to address the extreme poverty in the northern region of
the country. These statements by notable politicians within and outside Nigeria link the root causes of Boko Haram to the deplorable economic conditions in the North of Nigeria. However, these statements were not supported by empirical evidence and did not tell us about the other contributory factors. More so, the views were not specific to Northeast Nigeria, and the community perspectives about the causes of Boko Haram were left out.

Notwithstanding, the politician’s statements reflect similar opinions made soon after the 9/11 attacks on the US. George Bush, a past president of the United States said that poverty, lack of education and failed governments are conditions that gave rise to terrorists (cited by Krueger, 2007:12). Tony Blair, a former British PM also said “The dragon’s teeth of terrorism are planted in the fertile soil.......of poverty and deprivations” (cited in Krueger, 2007:13). Lastly, James Wolfensohn, the past president of the World Bank further said “The war on terrorism will not be won until we have come to grips with the problem of poverty and thus the sources of discontent” (cited by Krueger, 2007:12). These notable politicians linked the causes of terror to poverty. The views about the causes of Boko Haram from the politician’s standpoint are similar to the statements made after the 9/11 terror attacks on the US. However, the circumstances of the cases are different, the US attack is internationally linked, but Boko Haram is a local terror organization.

Contrarily, Krueger (2007) and Piazza (2006) used empirical studies to demonstrate that there are no correlations between poverty and terrorism. In the Nigerian case, Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, the national president of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) disagrees with the politicians on the link between poverty and Boko Haram. Oritsejafor said, “It’s an insult to say that the poor people are turning to extremist because they are poor.” He further cited the failed amnesty program and the subsequent emergency rules in three states in Northeast Nigeria to support the fact that poverty is not the sole cause of insurgency in Northern Nigeria. More so, according to the Associated Press (AP), Boko Haram said that the Nigeria government would not know peace until it adopts sharia law. This suggests that ideology plays a role in the group’s motivation, but the views of the politicians did not reflect this dimension.

In addition to the political statements, there are several conspiracy theories about the causes of Boko Haram particularly from the ruling and the opposition parties in Nigeria. The ruling party, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) view is that the opposition party, All Progressive Alliance (APC) is the sponsors of Boko Haram, a ploy to discredit the present government headed by a President from the southern region of Nigeria (Metuh, cited in Premium Times, 2014). The APC on the other hand, argue that the Government is the sponsor of Boko Haram, due to its failed effort to contain the group, some serving government officers have also been linked to the group activities (Ameachi, cited in Sun,
Although, these views were considered politically and ethnically motivated, it did not represent the opinion of the entire Nigerians. These views also require empirical evidence to support the arguments.

The causal link between the Boko Haram insurgency and the underlying socio-economic conditions in Nigeria can be explained by the root cause theory, basic need theory, and the relative deprivation theory (David, 2013; Agbiboa, 2013). Newman (2006) postulates that there is a causal link between terrorism and the underlying socio-economic conditions. Newman further asserts that factors such as poverty, social inequality, exclusion, and political grievance, are the independent variables on which the emergences of terrorist and extremist group are dependent (Newman 2006:751). Applying this to Nigeria, it can be inferred that the primary causes of conflicts in Nigeria is the inability of people to meet their basic needs (Burton, 1997). The CfR (2014) earlier points to the falling standard of living in the country despite the growing economy. This is relevant to Burton (1997) argument that if the basic needs are not met it cause frustration, and people seek alternatives to satisfy them. Agbiboa (2013) further explains, “a swelling population amid economic despair not only creates an environment in which radical extremist groups can thrive, but also legitimizes their actions.”

As a remedy to Boko Haram insurgency, Aigbiboa (2013) suggest that the Nigeria government should look at the deplorable living condition; poverty and economic deprivation especially in the northeastern region where Boko Haram originated. This is in consonance with Gurr (1970) argument; people become dissatisfied if they feel that they have less than they should and could have, over time, such dissatisfaction leads to frustration and then rebellion. The relative deprivation theory enhances understanding of the disparities between South and North of Nigeria, occasioned by the oil wealth in the southern region. The rebellion from the northern parts of the country can be likened to the perceived unfair benefits from the proceeds of the oil revenue (Aigbobia, 2013).

The structural disparities between South and North of Nigeria can be further explained using the poverty and the unemployment profiles in Nigeria. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) poverty assessment report 2006 reveals that poverty was regarded as an important phenomenon in the northern region of the country. The CBN report shows that the ‘top ten’ poverty- riddled states in Nigeria are in the north; Jigawa state tops the list as the poorest state in the country with 95% high incidence of poverty, followed by Kebbi with 89.7%, Kogi 88.6%, Bauchi 86.3%, Kwara 85.2%, Yobe 83.3%, Zamfara 80.9% Gombe 77%, Sokoto 76.8% and Adamawa 71.7% (CBN, 2006).

A further analysis of the poverty statistics in Nigeria using the National Bureau of Statistics (2011) data indicates that the northeastern region of the country where Boko
Haram originated ranked among the area with the worst poverty incidence in the country as depicted in the table (1) below:

Table 1: Showing Poverty Profile in Nigeria by Regions (1980 to 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>South South</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>35.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>South East</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>South West</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td><strong>North East</strong></td>
<td><strong>35.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>54.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>54.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>70.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>72.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>North West</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
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</table>


The table (1) shows the poverty profiles for the Nigeria regions for selected years from 1980 to 2004. The figure shows that the northeast and northwest zones of the country have the worst poverty profiles in the country. In 2004, for example, the northeast poverty level is 72.2 percent, compared to the south east of 26.7 percent.

Similarly, the analysis of the unemployment trend in the country shows that from 2008 to 2010 the rates of unemployment for all the northeastern states (38.0) were above the national average (21.7) (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). It shows that the northeast region ranks among the zones in the country with the highest poverty and unemployment rates in the country. The period of the maximum unemployment rate also coincides with the outbreak of violence in 2009 from the militant Boko Haram groups as indicated in the NBS data (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). These analyzes show the disparities in the poverty and unemployment rates between the North and South of Nigeria.

The root cause theory, basic human need, and the relative deprivation provide relevant explanations about the link between the alleged Boko Haram insurgency and the socio-economic conditions in Nigeria. The evidence from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 2006 and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2011 data sheds light on this causal relationship. However, the other contributory factors such as ideologies were not captured in these explanations. More so, these explanations did not tell us about the impact of insurgency on livelihoods and how the affected rural populations are coping with the events. The communities or the affected population perspectives are also lacking. These issues in my opinion are the gaps in these studies. Although, Denoeux and Carter (2009) categorize the drivers of violent extremism into three broad categories: socioeconomic drivers, political drivers, and cultural drivers. They further said that these drivers could be separated at the level of analysis into “Pull” and “push” factors. But this framework has not been applied to Nigeria.
The Effects of Extremism on Livelihoods

Carolyn Nordstrom in her book “A Different Kind of War Story,” said, the devastating impacts of terror warfare on people, societies, and cultures are shared across nations (Nordstrom, 1997: xvii). However, in the case of Tami in Sri Lanka, Nordstrom said that she was frustrated because there was no information in the literature on how to carry out ethnographic study in violent areas. Young et al. (2005: vii) in relation to the Darfur conflict asserts, “livelihoods are integral to the causes of conflict and the impact it has had, and therefore will be central to any lasting solutions to the conflict”. Young and Osman (2006) conclude, “Conflict and peoples livelihoods are inextricably linked”. Thus, it can be inferred that there are similarities across nations on the impact of violence on livelihoods. Therefore, it can be assumed that the effect of Boko Haram can be understood through a review of similar contexts. Let us now examine some studies on the consequences of conflict on livelihoods and their limitations.

In a high-level meeting of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Justino (2012:2) said, conflict and violence impact on the lives and livelihoods of individuals, households and communities directly and indirectly. Nigel (2002) adds, “Conflicts destroy livelihoods, either directly through causing death and destroying property, or indirectly by limiting freedom of choice and adaptive behavior, thereby hampering the pursuit of successful survival strategies.” Justino (2012:2) further note that direct effects of conflict include changes in household composition and economic status; whereas indirect channels includes changes in local and national markets and social relations. With regards to poverty, Collier (2007) asserts that violent conflict creates cycles of conflict and poverty. Thus, it can be deduced that violence can have direct or indirect consequences on livelihoods, as well as short and long-term effects. However, irrespective of the nature of the impact of conflict, Justino (2012:3) conclude that violent conflict kills and disables people, destroys productive assets, and block individuals and households access to their sources of livelihood and economic survival. Let’s examine the impact of Boko Haram’s insurgency in Northeast Nigeria.

The UN Security Council report (2014) acknowledges the increasing insurgent attacks targeting civilians and livelihoods in the northeastern states of Nigeria, seizing towns and compelling large numbers of people to flee to neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The Human Rights Watch report (2014) adds, the Boko Haram attacks have been on the increase since the beginning of this year, with almost daily killings, bombings, kidnappings, thefts, and the destruction of livelihoods, Churches, Mosques, schools, homes, bridges and businesses. The Human Rights Watch also asserts that the effects of violence are more pronounced in local communities in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. The effects of conflict are increasingly felt in the rural community and the individual levels (USAID, 2005:3). However, a survey of literature shows that there have not been empirical studies on the consequence of Boko Haram on rural communities in Northeast Nigeria due to security challenges in the region.
Nevertheless, the studies on the impacts of conflict on livelihoods in Liberia, Rwanda, Nepal and Srilanka provide relevant information on the effects of conflict on rural populations. Longley et al. (2003) described the impact of war on rural livelihoods in Kambia District, Liberia, notes that there were huge displacements, but at the same time some communities were resilient in negotiating peace and reconciliations. In the case of Burundi and Rwanda, there were increases in the prices of staple foods as a result of the destructions of agricultural lands and subsequent scarcity of farm produce (Bundervoet, 2006; Verpoorten, 2009). Seddon and Hussein (2002) on the impact of Maoists insurgency in Nepal said the main local effects of the conflict are: rural exodus on the part of the local elite, and the local government officials, and the destruction of economic activities and local infrastructures. These three cases points to: Direct effects (displacements in Liberia) and indirect effects (rise in prices in Burundi and Rwanda) and associated responses (mass exodus in Nepal) by the affected populations, among others. In the case of Nigeria, a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture in Borno State said, “The economic impact is enormous, the supply of farm products such as tomatoes, which was coming in from the Maiduguri zone has reduced drastically, and prices have gone up”.

Contrarily, Korf (2001) in a study of the livelihood strategies of war-affected communities in Sri Lanka, concludes that war can be both a threat and an opportunity; hence, civilians in conflict situations are not all victims. Schafer (2002) supports this argument, notes, “certain livelihood strategies are part of the dynamics that can contribute to, and sustain conflict and instability.” According to Keen (1998), people affected by violent conflict can also benefit from the proceeds of looting during armed conflict. These suggest that livelihood strategies can also contribute or fuel conflict. Thus, it can be inferred that conflict has a negative and positive impact on some populations, unlike the negative effects as its in the cases of Liberia, Rwanda/Burundi, and Nepal. In the case of Sri-Lanka, livelihoods strategies, also feed into the conflict. In the case of Northeast Nigeria, Campbell (2012) alleged that Boko Haram is having support from the impoverished and alienated Northern Nigeria communities, but it lacks empirical evidence.

On the coping mechanisms, Patricial Justino asserts that people usually leave places of more severe fighting to refugee and displacement camps, or move to safe areas or travel abroad (Justino, 2012:2). However, Justino also contends that numerous people stay behind in conflict zones and survive, carrying on their daily livelihood tasks in the midst of conflict and violence. In the case of Somalia with a dysfunctional government and weak institutions, FAO notes that: “Somalis rely on their resilience as individuals, households and communities to protect their lives and livelihoods.” De Waal, (1997) concludes that local coping strategies are the most important component of people’s survival in many conflict situations. It can be deduced that people often flee from violence, but at the same time some are resilience. The rationale for the different choices is therefore important, particularly on the source of resilience or copying mechanism.
In the case of Nigeria, According to the opposition presidential candidate, Muhammad Buhari “Boko Haram has sadly put Nigeria on the terrorism map, killing more than 13,000 of our nationals, displacing millions internally and externally, and at a time holding on to portions of our territory the size of Belgium”. The UNHCR estimates that as of October 2014, 4.6 million people have been displaced in Northeast Nigeria, and many children are suffering from malnutrition. However, there are little information about those that remains in the affected areas in Northeast Nigeria, and most important, how they are coping with livelihoods tasks in the midst of the militants. These points to the need to understand the sources of resilience and the livelihood strategies use by the communities to cope with extremist events.

**Strategies for Coping with Violent Extremism**

The livelihoods concept was initially applied in development studies in the 1980s to understand the components of people’s livelihood assets and the survival strategies of the rural poor (Chambers and Comway, 1992). According to Robert Chambers, the livelihood approach examines issues such as “where people are, what they have and what their needs and interests are” (Chambers, 1988a, p. 1). However, the shifts in approach to development in 1980s and 1990 with the publication of the Brundtland Commission Report “Our Common Future” led to the concept of sustainable livelihood approach (Chambers and Conway, 1992). Following the Brundtland report, development priority shifts to human well-being and sustainability rather than economic growth (Brundtland Commission Report, 1997). Thus, the need to reconcile economic growth with standard of living and perhaps the effect on the environment were considered as critical factors in assessing economic growth.

In support of the Brundtland Commission’s report and livelihoods approach, Sen (1999:289) points out that the livelihoods approach opposes the traditional economic measures of poverty that emphasizes production or income (or just economic growth) without making reference to the living standard of the populations. Schafer (2002:20) adds that the level of revenue or production alone does not tell if poor people can secure a livelihood and achieve their goals. Thus, the livelihoods approach enhances the understanding of the people assets and resources, and the strategies and practices that people pursue to enhance their well-being (Chambers, 1983:46). Chambers and Conway (1992), Sen (1999), and Schafer (2002) highlighted the fundamental importance of the inclusion of poor people’s well-being in assessing short and long-term economic growth.

This explanation has particular relevance to the Nigeria’s situation. Presently, Nigerian economy is the 26th largest in the world and the leading economy in Africa. The Nigerian
The economy has a gross domestic product of over $500 billion per annum, and stable economic growth rate of 7% for the past five years (Premium Times, 2014). However, these statistics do not tell if the quality of life of ordinary Nigeria has changed and whether the available resources were used in a transparent way. Put differently, the macroeconomic indicators of Nigeria are entirely different from what is happening at the micro-level, characterized by increasing poverty and structural violence (CfR, 2014).

I think that the livelihoods approach can be applied to explain the micro and macro-level economic growth in Nigeria, and Northeast Nigeria in particular as postulated by Sen (1999) and Schafer (2002). It will provide an explanation that is not skewed to economic growth only without an explanation about the rural poor well-being.

According to Young et al “The livelihoods conceptual framework combines a local level (micro) analysis and the understanding of the impact of the crisis on livelihoods with a more macro analysis of the conflict itself and the wider national, transnational and international factors that are affecting livelihoods” (Young et al (2005). The sustainable livelihood analysis provides a balanced assessment of the micro and macro-level analysis of the livelihoods resources and the impacts of conflict and vice versa. In addition, the non-income focus of the livelihood approach makes it adaptable to the rural condition as stipulated by (Chambers 1998a; Sen 1999; Schafer 2002). The livelihood approach is, therefore, significant in studying rural poor people based on the idea that the rural population’s interest is a top priority in addressing their problems (Chambers and Comway 1999). Let’s now review the components of a sustainable livelihood framework (SLF). The diagram below illustrates the SLF (Figure 1).

**Figure 1: The Livelihood System Framework**

![Livelihood System Framework](source: Carney (1998))

H = Human Capital, S = Social Capital, N = Natural Capital, P = Physical Capital and F = Financial Capital

The diagram above is an illustration of the livelihood approach (Carney, 1998). It depicts the components of the livelihood framework: the livelihood assets; the vulnerability, policy, institutions and processes; and the loop linking livelihood strategies and livelihood outcomes (DFID, 1991). According to Schafer (2002), the livelihoods strategies are the results of the analysis of assets (Social capital, Physical capital, Human capital,
Natural capital and Financial capital) and how it is affected or influenced by the vulnerability (shocks from violence) and by policy and institutions. The unit of livelihoods analysis is individuals and households (micro), and it also involves macro analysis (Young et al., 2005). This analysis is fundamental to understanding the impact or consequences of violence on livelihoods and the coping strategies of the rural poor people (Chambers and Conway, 1992). The DfID summarized the core principles of the sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA) to include: People-centered, people actors, local-level activity as the foundation for the development of policy, encourage partnership with government, private sectors and NGOs, and maintain balance with the three elements of sustainability--economic, social and environmental (DfID, 1999:7).

Nonetheless, the livelihood approach is not without limitations. The main criticism of the livelihood framework was that it did not capture the effect of power and politics in livelihood (Baumann, 2000). Livelihood approach was also regarded as a development concept that has been mainly applied to development studies in different topics such as: Problems livelihoods (Chambers & Conway 1992; Carney 1998) and livelihoods diversification (Ellis 2000). In line with this, Francis (2000) “Making a Living: Changing Livelihoods in Rural Africa” explores responses to changing livelihoods of rural people such as disappearing job prospects, falling agricultural output, collapsing infrastructure and withdrawal of public services. She asked what are the different strategies employed by the rural poor in different parts of Africa. These studies according to Nigel include a component of the strategies and practices pursued by people in their day-to-day struggle for making a living (Nigel, (2009:24). Livelihoods analyses were originally applied to development studies. The applications of the framework to violent conflict were originally considered impossible because developments are long-term interventions.

However, Jacobsen (2002), Collinson (2003), and Korf (2003a) have adapted the livelihood framework to complex emergencies including protracted conflicts. Schafer (2002:1) adds, as conflicts continue over a long term, and the fact that people do survive in many situations of conflict and political instability, suggests that livelihood analysis is appropriate in conflict situations and can be utilized to identify opportunities for improved assistance. Scoones (1991) distinguishes between ‘copings’, which involves temporary adjustments to livelihoods in the face of change, and ‘adaptation’, which involves a longer term shift in livelihood strategies. Although, the livelihoods approach was originally considered a development concept, recent studies have also shown that it can be applied to violent conflict, including extremist violent situations. Let’s review recent projects that have used the livelihoods framework.

The situations of chronic conflict and political instability (SC CPI) project by the DfID and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) examines issues of protection and supporting livelihoods in situations of conflict in Nepal, Afghanistan, Somalia, Columbia and Kosovo (Montani and Majid, 2002). In the case of Somalia, the project highlights the ways in which programming decisions can be moved from “free seeds and tools distribution to...
sustainable agricultural support project.” (Montani and Majid, 2002). The SCCPI project principally linked the relief to development continuum, thereby providing practical ways that relief assistance can be channeled for long-term development purposes.

In addition to SCCPI, the livelihoods project by the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) sponsored by the DFID, European Union are ongoing in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Uganda. According to SLRC (2014), the projects examine how people are making a living, educate their children, and access other essential services in conflict-affected situations (CAS). It can be inferred that the lessons and approaches from these projects can help to inform and redress some of the current challenges in the implementation of humanitarian assistance and development projects in Northeast Nigeria. Longley and Maxwell (2003) argue that principled livelihoods support in situations of conflict is not only desirable, but it is essential to save lives. Young & Osman (2006) also add, “Livelihoods cannot be considered only in terms of household access to resources and capital and related livelihood strategies.” The other ways in which the livelihood approach can be applied to the Northeast Nigeria are discussed below.

Livelihood strategies for coping with extremism

The livelihood approach can be applied to understand the consequences of insurgency and how rural communities in Northeast Nigeria are coping with extremist activities. On the impact of conflict on livelihoods, Young et al., said that the livelihoods approach is fundamental in two ways: “Livelihoods are integral to the causes of conflict and the impact it has had, and therefore will be central to any lasting solutions to the conflict” (Young et al., 2005: vii). The “livelihoods approach combines a local level analysis and understanding of the impact of the crisis on livelihoods with a more macro analysis of the conflict itself and the wider national, transnational and international factors that are affecting livelihoods” (Young et al (2005). It implies that this approach is fundamental to understanding the consequences of conflict in rural households (directly or indirectly). The framework also provides analysis of the local and the international effects of conflict on livelihood. In this regard, the livelihood theory will enhance understanding of the micro-and macro consequences of the Boko Haram’s insurgency.

According to Schafer (2002), livelihood analysis highlights the sources of resilience in order to identify opportunities for improved assistance. Korf (2000:129) further adds, “An important strength of the livelihoods frame compared to earlier approaches is that it emphasizes on people potential in a holistic way rather than stressing their problems, constraints and needs.” Korf (2003a) also maintains that the so-called victims are more resilient than is generally suggested. De Waal, (1994, p.140), further added that local coping strategies are the most important component of people’s survival in many crisis situations. In this regard, the livelihood theory enhance understanding of the sources of resilience by rural communities that can be further build upon through development programming and other conflict resolution interventions.
The livelihoods theories also enable an understanding about the different strategies that people employ to cope with violent situations. Rennie and Singh (1996) argue that when faced with conflict situations, households may find themselves either struggling to survive in the most severe cases, or adopting coping strategies or adapting strategies to deal with sudden shocks or gradual trends. Jaspers & Shoham (2002) also said that households respond by changing strategies to ensure their survival in conflict situations. In such cases, people affected by conflict strategize for surviving immediate threats and overcoming long-term threats to their livelihoods. The livelihood theory, therefore, enables us to understand the strategies employed by different households by analyzing how the rural communities organize household assets or resources in response to shocks and influences from policies, institutions and other external factors.

**Conclusion**

This paper is an analysis of the causes, effects and the strategies use for coping with violent extremism in Northeast Nigeria. The technique employed for the study is desk research, review of secondary information from sources such as journal articles, reports from local and international organizations and the media. The study contends that the theory of basic human need and relative deprivation are relevant in explaining the socio-economic disparities that have led to the emergence of Boko Haram. However, the drivers of violent extremism, the effects on livelihoods, and the strategies adopted by rural communities to cope with insurgencies in Northeast Nigeria remains relatively understudied. The main findings from the study include socio-economic and ideological variables as the main drivers of violent extremism, the direct and indirect impacts include deaths, displacements and rise in food prices. The application of the sustainable livelihood framework (SLF) was recommended in assessing the strategies employed by rural communities in Northeast Nigeria to cope with violent extremism.
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PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN: A CASE STUDY OF MILITARY-LED DEVELOPMENT – Arthur Gibb

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Introduction:

At the end of December, 2014, the United States withdrew the last of its combat troops from Afghanistan, ending a 13-year mission that began as an effort to replace the Taliban government which had supported terrorist attacks against the United States with a more responsible one that would govern in a way more aligned with accepted international norms. Over the course of that 13 years, political and economic development became principle goals of the mission to stabilize Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the security environment present in much of Afghanistan for most of that 13 years precluded traditional development agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from operating safely, and the massive scale of development needed to bring Afghanistan into the twenty-first century posed coordination challenges that few – if any – had the capacity to overcome. In this complex environment, the U.S. government tasked the military with the unenviable task of spear-heading and coordinating the development effort as part of the broader reconstruction and stabilization mission. This paper examines the role of the principle mechanism for military-led development in Afghanistan, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Background

Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs, were the first institutionalized effort to synchronize and coordinate civilian and military development efforts since the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam. Although designed with an emphasis on security and force protection in light of the high-threat environment they faced in Afghanistan, the PRTs were intended to reflect the “whole of government” approach to development in Afghanistan, incorporating civilian experts in development and government within a military team to direct the teams development efforts and help them coordinate with international development agencies and NGOs. It was (and remains) a fundamental tenet of U.S. policy that security and development are inextricably linked. Significant development can only happen in a relatively secure environment. However, development can lead to improved security by
creating jobs, improving the economy, and improving people’s quality of life, giving them hope for the future and a reason to support existing government institutions. Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine identifies development as an important mechanism for separating the population from the insurgency, denying the latter support and sanctuary (U.S. Army 2006). The American PRTs conducted small-scale, humanitarian development projects as a way to prove their good intentions, build trust and loyalty with the local population, and demonstrate the advantages that came with supporting the coalition and the Afghan government. This was expected to lead to improved security conditions as locals ceased their support for the insurgency and began to cooperate with the PRT, taking a more active role in their own security and providing the PRT with information about insurgents and their operations, ultimately helping the coalition to drive the insurgency out of the area. With improved security, the PRT could then undertake or facilitate larger-scale development projects that had the potential to significantly boost economic growth and improve the reach and service capacity of the central government.

In early 2003, the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) established four PRTs in Gardez, Kunduz, Bamyen, and Mazar-e Sharif, strategic locations that corresponded to heavy concentrations of the country’s four main ethnic groups – Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. PRTs were intended to monitor the security situation, be the eyes and ears of coordinating bodies in Kabul, and be the locus of civil-military efforts to facilitate political and economic development, a parallel line of effort to the kinetic counterterrorism activities of the coalition forces (McNerney 2006). U.S. forces established three of the first four PRTs, while the British stood up the PRT in Mazar-e Sharif. However, before the end of 2003, the U.S. turned over control of the PRTs in relatively stable Kunduz and Bamyen to coalition members Germany and New Zealand, respectively, freeing up U.S. assets to expand PRTs into higher-threat provinces in the south and east.

In late-2003, Lieutenant General David Barno took command of U.S. and coalition forces, and immediately laid out a plan to expand the PRTs throughout Afghanistan. LTG Barno believed that the military strategy needed to shift from the capture or kill of counterterrorism to a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, with an emphasis on extending the security footprint in order to separate the local populations from the residual Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters, and on extending the reach of the Afghan government and the international presence to areas with which they had had little or no contact. American COIN strategy is premised on transitioning through three phases – a kinetic “clear” phase in which the insurgent forces are pushed out of an area, a stabilizing “hold” phase where coalition forces provide security while local authorities establish their credibility and capacities, and a final “build” phase, in which American and international development assistance is used to build the economic and political infrastructure needed for long-lasting stability (U.S. Army 2006). Establishing more PRTs

throughout the provinces would create pockets of security from which to coordinate
economic development and build the capacity for governance at the local level, which
could then be linked to the central government in Kabul.

By mid-2005 PRTs were established in 21 of the 34 provinces (there would be 26 at their
peak in 2009), and the strategy appeared to be working. In the north, things were quiet
and relatively peaceful. PRTs in these areas were either established by or turned over to
non-U.S. coalition partners, but development capacities, competencies, and resources
varied widely. Those run by the British and Germans had fairly robust development
capabilities, but most others performed largely in a more traditional peacekeeping role,
leaving development activities to international agencies and NGOs (USIP 2009i). In the
south, an increased U.S. troop presence and the expansion of the PRTs had pushed the
remaining Taliban insurgents mostly out of the provinces and into Pakistan.

Then came the spring offensive in 2006, and for the next five years a reenergized
insurgency spread throughout the southern and eastern provinces, and even into
pockets of the north and west. Violence increased dramatically as insurgents resorted
to asymmetric tactics, most effectively the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
remotely- or automatically-triggered bombs that could be hidden from view and
exploded with devastating effect against U.S. and coalition troops and vehicles. In 2009,
violent attacks and U.S. casualties reached their highest levels of the war. Over the next
five years, violence continued largely unabated, and after 2010 the PRTs began to slowly
shut down in anticipation of the U.S. withdrawal in 2014. Despite the investment of
billions of dollars, and no small number of visible development successes, the
development effort had failed to inspire sufficient economic development to undermine
the insurgency or stabilize much of Afghanistan.

The examination which follows reveals that the PRTs – and by extension the
development mission writ large – failed to achieve their development goals for three
principle reasons. First, the PRTs were too few in number and insufficiently resourced.
This limited their capacity to effectively stabilize their areas of responsibility and conduct
development on the scale necessary to make a lasting change. A second reason was the failure
to create effective support and coordination mechanisms for the PRTs, which resulted
in crippling inefficiencies. Finally, the PRTs were attempting to impose Western-style
order and values on a culture with a long tradition of decentralized and autonomous
tribal authority, a history of deep tribal and clan rivalries, a near-institutionalized
acceptance of patronage and corruption, and a debilitating lack of human capacity. The
failure to fully understand these cultural realities led to tactical and strategic mistakes
which undermined the PRTs’ efforts to foster stability and security through
development.

Lack of Capacity

There were effectively two aspects to the development mission of the PRTs. The first
was to provide small scale, quick-impact development projects that would foster good will among the Afghan population. Digging wells, rehabilitating or building schools and clinics, and building or paving roads creates jobs, injected money into the local economy, and established relationships between the PRT and the local population. These projects usually met humanitarian needs that were beyond the capacity of the Afghan government, and so would otherwise have gone unaddressed. Such projects are often referred to as part of a “hearts and minds” campaign, but they are more accurately about building mutual trust, understanding, and respect, which can help to drive a wedge between insurgents and the population, and advance the stabilization mission from the hold to the build phase.

The second aspect of the development mission was to assist the provincial authorities to create a plan for longer term development, and to coordinate the approval, funding, and completion of those projects with the government in Kabul, ISAF, and international development agencies and NGOs. This aspect of the mission was also intended to help build the capacity of the provincial government, link it to the central government, and produce visible achievements that the local population could associate with the government. PRT efforts in this realm contributed to a long list of major development successes, including the construction of over 4000 kilometers of paved roads, strong economic growth, improved infrastructure, the expansion of public and private service sectors, and an increase in primary education enrollment from 19% in 2001 to over 90% by 2006 (Jones 2008; Prague Security Studies Institute (hereafter PSSI) 2010).

American PRTs in Afghanistan lacked the capacity to effectively carry out either of their development missions in two important ways. The first is the fact that they were grossly insufficient, both in number and in size, given the geographic context in which they were employed. At best, each PRT was responsible for an entire province, hundreds of square miles of imposing, mostly uninhabited terrain, with few roads and little to no infrastructure. In the north and west, some PRTs were at times responsible for as many as four provinces, making it impossible to reach all but a small number of districts and villages with any consistency, if at all. In some provinces, the combination of inaccessible terrain and poor security restricted the PRTs to the provincial capital and its immediate environs, leaving them with little or no awareness of what was happening at the district level, much less in the villages (Combat Studies Institute 2008b).

As a strategy, the lack of attention and development resources dedicated to the northern and western provinces seems somewhat at odds with the COIN principle of clear, hold, and build. The permissive environment in the north and west could have allowed PRTs there to consolidate their hold on the region and begin an extensive build campaign as early as 2004, giving the Kabul government the opportunity to establish legitimacy among the northern population and government officials the chance to gain valuable experience that could later have been transferred to more challenging areas in the south. The U.S. strategy, however, beginning in 2004, followed the dictates of

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4 Under the peak distribution of 28 PRTs, a few covered two provinces, while the majority covered a single province.
“economy of force,” focusing the majority of U.S. effort in the areas where the enemy was strongest.5

There was also a huge disparity between the capacities of the American PRTs and those run by other coalition nations. The German and British PRTs had relatively good development capacity, but were limited by national policies and priorities mostly to small-scale development projects. The other coalition PRTs were very lightly resourced, and since they were established in the more secure provinces of the north and west, they concentrated their efforts on security sector reform and training local ANSF, leaving development in the more permissive environment to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and NGOs (USIP 2009i; 2009j; 2009k). Coalition partners were generally responsible for all coalition activities in their province, so while the U.S. generally had State Department representatives on the coalition PRTs, it directed very little, if any, money for development to these provinces. Civilian and military personnel alike serving on PRTs in the more stable provinces report feeling ignored or neglected by Afghan and ISAF decision makers in Kabul (USIP 2009c; 2009m; 2009n). Ironically, this created a perverse incentive among warlords, tribal leaders, and even government officials to stir up trouble, since they saw development money flowing into areas where security was poor.6

The second factor affecting the capacity of PRTs to do development work was the inability of the civilian interagency – in particular the State Department, the Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) – to support the teams with enough civilian development experts.7 During the first several years, many positions simply went unfilled, and those that were filled were usually filled by junior personnel without much relevant experience or expertise. They also had no authority to commit agency funds, and lacked the institutional knowledge to competently represent the interests and capabilities of their parent agencies (McNerney 2006; USIP 2009c). Additionally, civilian agencies often lacked operational funding to support their people, so team members were reliant on the military for all of their critical life support, including accommodations, food, transportation, and body armor (USIP 2009a; 2009d). The civilians were intended to take the lead on development and governance issues, but in contrast to the PRT commander, a Lieutenant Colonel or Navy Commander with 17-20 years of leadership experience and ample military resources on which to draw, their relative lack of experience and resources undermined both their credibility and value, and relegated them to an advisory role (State 2006). Without agency funding to support their own initiatives, they were left to lobby the PRT

5Telephone interview, LTG Barno.
6Telephone interview, Nuristan PRT CO.
7This discussion focuses on U.S. PRTs, but coalition PRTs that saw their mission as primarily peacekeeping were similarly short on civilian development capacity. The U.S. tried to assign interagency representatives to coalition PRTs, but they usually came with no resources and were there primarily as a conduit for information to U.S. leaders and to coordinate with NGOs doing development work in the region.
commander to allocate military funds to projects they felt were important. This meant that decisions about development projects were often made by military personnel without significant experience in development, leading to an emphasis on security-related projects and quick-impact projects that were intended to help build relationships, but that frequently were not sustainable. Many civilian PRT members felt that military commanders, because of the professional incentives to demonstrate effectiveness, often based their decisions on how many projects they could initiate and bring to completion in their limited time in country, rather than on what was most needed or sustainable (USIP 2009f; 2009h; Stapleton 2007).

The military had its own issues with regard to assigning personnel with the necessary skills. As PRTs increasingly contracted with local contractors and NGOs to carry out development projects, they often did so without trained or experienced contract officers or lawyers from the Judge Advocate General Corps (U.S. Navy 2009a; 2010; USIP 2009m). The military component often included civil engineers from the Navy SEABEEs or Army Corps of Engineers, but this was not standard, and they did not always have expertise specific to the kinds of projects being undertaken (U.S. Navy 2009b). This made it difficult to provide oversight and ensure quality control by local contractors. The military also relied heavily on the Reserves and National Guard. Many of these personnel possessed invaluable skills and experience from their civilian jobs, but they were generally deployed as a unit, and no effort was made to match civilian skills with the specific needs of the various PRTs (Combat Studies institute 2008a).

The biggest mismatch between capacity and need was in the agriculture sector. More than 80% of the Afghan population is involved in agriculture, most of it at the subsistence level, and yet USDA was able to provide only very limited support to the PRTs, and a majority of USAID funding was devoted to infrastructure projects. Very few military members of the PRT had relevant agriculture experience, so commanders often chose to put their efforts and money into schools, clinics, and roads that were more visible and could be contracted to locals. Ironically, National Guard units throughout the Midwest have been fielding Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) to Latin America for over 20 years, leveraging the farming and agriculture experience of Guard members to improve agriculture processes and production (U.S. Army 2008). Yet for some reason, these teams were not deployed to Afghanistan until 2008, and in 2012 there were only eight in country, despite the fact that at least 12 states have ADTs in their Guard units (USIP 2009f).

Support from civilian agencies began to improve in 2006, slowly at first, but by 2010 it was apparent that both Congress and the executive branch were committed to bolstering civilian reconstruction capacity. The Bush administration created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the State Department in 2004 as a first step towards synchronizing civilian support for reconstruction with the military. Since 2006, Congress has appropriated increasing program support to hire and train more than 3000 additional civil servants and Foreign Service Officers at State and USAID and has doubled appropriations for State and other
interagency overseas operations (State 2010; “Executive Budget Summary”). Congress also authorized the establishment of a Civilian Response Corps under S/CRS, which by 2011 included over 1200 “active” and “standby” civilian employees from seven different agencies who could be deployed to support reconstruction operations around the world. As a result, most teams now have a strong representative from State, USAID, and USDA, at a minimum, as well as occasional representation from Justice, Energy, Commerce, and other agencies (State 2011a).

Support and Coordination

Post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan called for a synergized, holistic, civil-military effort that took advantage of the logistical capacity, manpower, and initiative of the military and the development experience and expertise of the civilian interagency. Coordinating such an effort called for well-defined and agreed-upon processes and mechanisms to align mission objectives with national priorities, and to synchronize allocation of resources and lines of effort, both vertically and horizontally. Unfortunately, no mechanisms for such close coordination existed at the outset, and the combination of poor security conditions and military resources that dwarfed those of the interagency rendered reconstruction a military-led and dominated effort from the very beginning. As reconstruction progressed, planning and coordination mechanisms evolved to try to support development at all levels. However, coordination was challenging, given the multitude of actors – civilian, military, American, Afghan, coalition partners, UNAMA, NATO, international organizations, and NGOs – all well-intentioned and committed to the goal of a stable Afghanistan, but each with different objectives, philosophies, policy guidance, and capabilities. Some of these mechanisms greatly improved the ability of PRTs to promote development at the provincial level and below, while the absence or poor design of others created inefficiencies and undermined effectiveness. For most of the last 10 years, the PRTs have been left largely to their own devices and ingenuity to navigate the web of competing or conflicting guidance emanating from Kabul, Washington, and other national capitals.

Undoubtedly, one of the most challenging aspects of putting together a civil-military team to promote development has been the culture clash between the disciplined, hierarchical, and well-resourced military and the bureaucratic, independent, and poorly-resourced civilian agencies. The loose guidance issued to the PRTs in order to give them flexibility to adapt to widely varying circumstances also created a great deal of confusion about the role of civilian members. While they were intended to be the lead agents for political and economic development, they were often relegated to advisory status because of lack of experience and funding (State 2006). Without specific guidance or a defined hierarchical relationship, civil-military relations on the PRTs were, to a great extent, a function of the personalities of the PRT commander and the representatives from the interagency. In many cases, the civilian leads and PRT commander worked very well together, but the challenges to team-building were many.
For the first two years, civilians did not go through pre-deployment training with the military team members, and their rotations were as short as three months, which was inadequate time to get enough of a sense of the situation and the mission to make any kind of real contribution. For the first several years, civilian billets were filled on a largely ad hoc basis, with the result that many did not have the skills, experience, or temperament needed by the PRTs. Many in the military assumed that State representatives were experts on political development and governance, when in fact, most had little to no relevant experience or expertise in how to run a government. Personnel from USDA often had very specific agricultural skill sets, applicable in only certain regions or environments, yet they were initially assigned without regard to matching their skills to the needs of the province (USIP 2009c).

Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, the PRT commander often determined the tenor of the civil-military relationship. An interagency assessment in 2006 concluded that there was often a “lack of understanding of the importance of incorporating non-Department of Defense representatives into strategy development and decision-making (State 2006, 14).” But to military officers, who approached every mission by first identifying goals, objectives, and available resources and then developing a strategic plan, the civilians did not appear to have any sort of plan or systematic approach to accomplishing their mission (Combat Studies Institute 2006). Some PRT commanders dictated the priority of all plans and operations, marginalizing those civilians who refused to get on board; others valued civilian inputs and incorporated them into their planning (USIP 2009l). Although a military officer was officially in charge of the PRT, some civilians resented being subordinate to them, believing that “the military should be a resource of the civilians, not the other way around (USIP 2009a).” Sometimes personality clashes resulted in civilians being sent home, or simply opting out of the mission, leaving military team members to fill their role. One USAID representative felt his authority was being usurped by the ADT, and asked to be reassigned elsewhere rather than working with them (USIP 2009f; 2009m).

Despite these difficulties, many PRTs were able to establish effective and supportive working relationships within the team. Teams lucky enough to be assigned military commanders who understood the importance of team-building and civilians who were knowledgeable and who could adapt rapidly to new situations and take initiative were often able to overcome the inherent structural inefficiencies. Many on both sides described their counterparts as “indispensable,” “critical,” or “top-notch.” Most importantly, the problems and failures identified over the first several years translated into proactive institutional changes within the interagency, and by 2009 many of the most debilitating issues had been or were actively being addressed (State 2011b).

A concerted effort by Congress and both the Bush and Obama administrations included the creation of the CRC, increased budget authority, and improved interagency coordination mechanisms in Washington. These actions tripled the number of civilians

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8 Military manning of the PRTs was also largely ad hoc for the first several years. Not until 2005 was there an effort to institutionalize the training and composition of the PRTs (Combat Studies Institute 2008a).
committed to the effort in Afghanistan by 2011 and induced a policy shift from filling vacancies with available bodies to assigning people with relevant training, experience, and expertise (PSSI 2010; USIP 2009g). By mid-2011, there were over 1000 federal civilians deployed to Afghanistan, up from 320 at the beginning of 2009, with a total of 1200 expected by the end of the year (State 2011b). Of 421 civilians that arrived in 2009 as part of a “civilian uplift,” (the interagency avoids the term surge), 270 were deployed outside of Kabul to PRTs, maneuver battalions, and brigade and division headquarters (USIP 2009g; 2009l). Civilian deployments were more often synched to those of the military, and most civilian representatives on PRTs began training with the military team for all or most of the pre-deployment training. Many deployed for a second time, or extended their deployment in the same location through two or more PRT rotations, providing invaluable continuity and field experience to the teams (U.S. Navy 2009a). Civilian instructors were also integrated into the training to better educate the military on the capacities of the other federal agencies. These changes helped to build mutual understanding and respect, break down preconceived notions and biases, and create a true civil-military command leadership team, greatly improving the functionality and effectiveness of the PRTs.

The ad hoc nature of funding for the PRTs was an additional source of tension between civilians and the military. Initially, most of the money came from a pre-existing DOD account used by the military worldwide for small scale development projects and disaster relief. In 2004, Congress began funding the Commanders’ Emergency Relief Program (CERP), designed to provide commanders in the field with readily available, unprogrammed money to “respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements” with quick-turn, high-impact projects that would have an immediate effect (U.S. Congress 2003). CERP money came with few strings attached, often allocated as cash to PRT and other military commanders to be used at their discretion.

State and USDA representatives, on the other hand, came with no money and no authority to commit agency funds. Not surprisingly, the agency that controls the money sets the priorities, and for the military commander, whose first priority was security and force protection, these were often projects that he felt would have an immediate impact and build some credibility and loyalty among the local population (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008). So while civilians were supposed to be the lead decision makers for political and economic development, they were forced to lobby the PRT commander to spend CERP money on projects they felt were important (USIP 2009f). USAID team members did have access to funds from the Quick Impact Program (QIP), but bureaucratic regulations, a lengthy approval process, and the requirement for all projects to be coordinated and overseen by a USAID implementing partner made this program less responsive than CERP and limited its value to the PRTs. Using CERP funds and hiring local contractors or NGOs, the PRT was often able to complete projects in less than half the time as those funded through QIP (State 2006).

Although interagency access to funding improved over time, the disparity between civil and military funding on the PRTs remained a structural reality, with 70% of PRT
development projects paid for with CERP funds (USAID 2012; U.S. Navy 2009b). Coordination on the use of CERP funds did improve dramatically, however. In part this was due to improved understanding and cooperation on the teams themselves, but it was also due to institutional changes put in place up the food chain from the teams. Guidance from the U.S. military commander in 2005 directed that all CERP projects be coordinated with USAID through civilian counterparts on the PRTs and, after the civilian “surge” that began in 2009, at battalion, brigade, and division headquarters (State 2006). Additionally, various spending thresholds were established, above which “dual-key” authorization was required by the lead civilian and the military commander at each level (USIP 2009g).

An additional challenge for the PRTs was the need to coordinate their development activities with a multitude of external actors. These other actors generally fell into three categories: officials of the Afghan provincial and national government; parallel civilian and military chains of command; and NGOs.

Although an important objective of the PRT’s development mission was to improve security and force protection by building good will among the local population, the mission’s larger goal was to promote sustainable economic development while simultaneously expanding the reach and legitimacy of the Afghan government. By working with the Provincial Governor, who was appointed by the central government, to bring needed infrastructure and other development to the provinces, the PRTs tried to demonstrate to the population the capacity and commitment of the government to bring stability and prosperity to the country. This was accomplished by helping the governor orchestrate a Provincial Development Plan (PDP), which prioritized projects within the province given the available funds from Kabul, the PRT, or ISAF. Provincial Development Committees (PDC), established in 2005, linked the provincial government with both local leaders and ministers in Kabul in order to align local priorities with the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), and ensure sustainability and commitment of resources from the national and provincial governments (ISAF 2008; USIP 2009f; Dziedzic and Seidl 2005).

In practice, like so many other aspects of reconstruction in Afghanistan, coordination of development between the PRT and the provincial government rarely functioned as intended. Success often depended significantly on the governor. Some of whom were men (and one woman) of integrity and courage committed to doing right by their people, but many others were corrupt and cowardly, prone to patronage, ethnic and tribal bias, and taking bribes. These men were generally unwilling to take political risks that could affect their standing in Kabul or to venture out of the capital except to cut ribbons at completed projects (U.S. Navy 2009a; 2009c; 2010; USIP 2009m). PDCs in many provinces were not established or not functioning until PRTs were established, some as late as 2010, so the PRT often put together the development plan, and then presented it to the governor and other officials for their approval to put an Afghan face on it (U.S. Navy 2009a). Building up the capacity and legitimacy of the PDCs was a major line of effort for many PRTs: mentoring local leaders to address the needs of their people and
to route their requests through the PDC; getting the governor to engage in the process rather than simply directing requests to the PRT; mentoring officials to lead the planning process; and fighting corruption (USIP 2009f; 2009m; U.S. Navy 2009b; 2009c).

Where they were successful, the PRTs used the PDC and the PDP process to highlight government responsiveness to the people and ensure that the plan effectively addressed prioritized local needs. This built legitimacy and support for both the provincial and national governments, and improved the security situation for the PRT and ISAF forces in the process (U.S. Navy 2009b; 2010; USIP 2009f). However, according to the assessment of at least one State Department representative, the process would quickly revert to traditional practices of patronage and bribery without the constant efforts of the PRT to enforce transparency and the integrity of the process and to assist the PDC with the hard work of developing a long-term plan (USIP 2009m). Corruption remained a common problem, and locals often tried to approach the PRTs directly with requests for development assistance, since they knew that is where the money was coming from, or because they were tired of the governor or members of the PDC demanding payment for inclusion in the PDP (USIP 2009f). Sub-governors or tribal leaders whose projects failed to gain the support of the PDC often become spoilers, refusing to provide security for travel or other projects in their area if their own projects are not approved (U.S. Navy 2010).

Linking the PRTs’ development efforts with the greater national effort was also difficult. A State Department-led interagency assessment conducted in late 2005 concluded that their efforts were, for the most part, not coordinated with national-level programs (State 2006). In fairness, the ANDS was not developed until the same year; prior to that there had only been a list of National Priority Programs (Stapleton 2007). Nor was there any standardized guidance for vertical coordination of development projects until ISAF published the ISAF PRT Handbook in 2006. But as late as 2009 there were still PRT commanders and entire brigade staffs who were completely unfamiliar with the ANDS (USIP 2009i).

Development was fraught with failures of vertical coordination between the national, provincial, district, and village levels, significantly undermining the effectiveness of the combined international effort (PSSI 2010). At times, the Afghan government criticized the PRTs for running a parallel development program, uncoordinated with national strategies and beyond the financial control of government ministries, but the PRTs responded that effective counterparts at the provincial and district levels simply did not exist (Stapleton 2007). With a national literacy rate of less than 30%, qualified locals were in high demand, and could often earn much more money working directly for the coalition or for international organizations and NGOs. Those that did choose to work in government preferred to do so in Kabul or one of a few smaller provincial capitals, where security was better, pay was higher, and they

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9 Telephone interview, Nuristan PRT CO.
were closer to the centers of power, rather than out in the provinces and districts where they were needed to help extend the reach of the government (Kemp 2011; USIP 2009m). The deterioration of the security situation in much of the southern and eastern provinces after 2006 also contributed to the disconnect between PRT efforts and the ANDS. As the insurgency spread, PRT commanders reported having to abandon approved projects, many of them major ones, due to lack of security. They often then reverted back to small, uncoordinated but quick-turn and immediate impact projects in order to try to restore local relations and improve security (U.S. Navy 2009a).

Coordination within the American architecture proved equally complex and inefficient. Along with the expansion of the PRTs in 2004, the U.S. strategy divided the country into five regional commands, with a military division assigned to each region as the “battle space owner,” responsible for the full spectrum of activity in its region. The Division Commander, a one or two-star general, further divided his battle space among a number of brigades. The Brigade Commander, a colonel, commanded the maneuver battalions that comprised his brigade and any PRT assigned to his area of responsibility, making him the individual most responsible for the operations of the PRT.

The relationship between ISAF and the PRTs was somewhat muddled because of the level of national autonomy reserved to the lead nations (Welle 2010). Although ISAF had supervisory authority over all PRTs, actual operational authority over American PRTs really lay with the Division Commander, who also controlled the allocation of CERP funds. ISAF at times issued operational or policy guidance directly to the PRTs, bypassing the Division and Brigade Commanders. This created confusion, but when direction from ISAF was uncoordinated or in conflict with orders from Division, PRT commanders generally ignored ISAF and complied with the orders of the U.S. Army general who wrote their fitness reports and controlled their development funds (Combat Studies Institute 2011; USIP 2009e; Stapleton 2007). Attempts by ISAF to get PRTs to report on common metrics so that ISAF could maintain a nation-wide awareness of progress and “atmospherics” failed to produce more than 20% of the data requested, largely because ISAF reports were a low priority for PRT commanders due to the informal nature of the relationship (Welle 2010, 57). Ironically, the lack of feedback from the field led to the development of policies by ISAF that PRT members charged were made in a vacuum and without PRT input.10

A parallel reporting system existed for the civilians, but it was even more confusing. Until 2009, State, USAID, USDA, and other interagency members each reported directly to representatives from their parent agency at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, or sometimes directly back to Washington. Not only did this hinder awareness, coordination, and information sharing, but it meant that the civilian leads for development were jumping over the brigade and division which directed the operations of the PRT and controlled the lion’s share of development funds.

10 Telephone interview, Nuristan PRT CO.
Not until after the civilian uplift in 2009 did the interagency consolidate all civilian activities under a single Deputy Director for PRTs at the U.S. Embassy and gain the capacity to mirror the military chain of command by assigning a lead civilian representative of equivalent rank to the commander at the brigade and division levels (USIP 2009e; 2009g).

Horizontal coordination at the national level was plagued by similar inefficiencies. Prior to the promulgation of the ANDS in 2005, individual agency strategic plans drawn up in Washington or at the embassy were not coordinated with each other and did not connect the PRT efforts to broader national programs (State 2006). Coordination between State and other agencies at the embassy and ISAF was plagued by parochial attitudes, poor communications, and civil-military tensions. Despite the Ambassador’s standing as the senior U.S. representative in Afghanistan, the military was clearly the most dominant player, and the embassy staff was reluctant to push back on initiatives of the commanding general, even when it appeared he was making a mistake (USIP 2009a). Insufficient vertical coordination with civilians on the PRTs and poor information systems meant that, as late as 2009, USAID did not have reliable data on the location and status of all of its completed, planned, and ongoing projects around the country (State 2006). This failure had been identified by an interagency assessment in 2005, but USAID had been unable to remedy it, and was reluctant to share what information it did have with counterparts at ISAF or in the Afghan government. State Department leaders were also uncooperative, resisting Afghan government efforts to have a greater say in PRT development efforts and refusing to participate in an ISAF effort to establish common goals and metrics for all PRTs because they did not align with the American objectives being promulgated from the embassy (USIP 2009b).

Some of the coordination failures, both vertical and horizontal, were a function of capacity. Lacking their own equipment, civilian representatives often relied on the military for communication with the embassy, and so could not always make or receive regular reports, choking off the vital flow of information in both directions. Even when they could get through, embassy manning until 2009 was extremely thin and turned over often, so the person they were trying to reach for support was frequently out of the office, recently arrived and still trying to build awareness, or on their way out the door (USIP 2009I). The PRT concept was predicated on the assumption that civilian team members were a conduit to reach-back support at the embassy and in Washington, but for the most part that support did not exist.

The interagency eventually made significant efforts to address many of these issues. The expansion of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization after its creation in 2004 and the creation of the CRC improved planning and coordination in Washington and increased the number of civilian personnel available to support the mission in Afghanistan. The Obama administration’s civilian uplift in 2009 increased the capacity at the embassy, consolidated the leadership of the civilian effort, and integrated civilians in the military chain of command, all of which greatly improved civilian support to the PRTs and the ability to coordinate development efforts across the country.
Not surprisingly, this architecture often led to conflicting and confusing guidance to the PRTs. To some extent, PRTs were a “rogue element,” responsible to so many masters that they effectively did not work for anyone (Combat Studies Institute 2011). Much of their autonomy came from their ability to spend CERP money. However, the loose control of CERP funds proved to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it has enabled PRT commanders to respond quickly and effectively to leaders from the governor down to the village level when doing so could improve working relations between the PRT, local government, and the population. Since it was the main source of funding for development, it also gave the PRT leverage over the governor and PDC to enforce a transparent and responsible development process that responded to the needs of the people (U.S. Navy 2009b). Although the locals understood that the money was coming from the Americans, allocating CERP money primarily to those projects that were integrated into the PDP and approved by the governor helped to connect the Kabul government to the people all the way down to the village level.

Unfortunately, loose control and a lack of standardization across divisions for delegating authority to commit CERP funds also resulted in poor oversight, creating the potential for fraud, corruption, and waste (DOD 2011). As a result, the Defense Department eventually increased the controls and restrictions on CERP funds, which increased the administrative burden on the PRT and slowed response and approval times. Demonstrating the disconnect between policy makers in Kabul and Washington and the reality on the ground in Afghanistan, most CERP expenditures were forced to comply with DOD Financial Management Regulations (FMR) and Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) manuals, which are intended to govern how DOD does business with U.S. and international contractors under normal circumstances, but are a poor fit for post-conflict reconstruction in a country like Afghanistan. Under the FMR and FAR, most projects in Afghanistan were required to meet U.S. building codes. This entailed the use of non-local materials, advantaging international contractors over local ones, and increased costs as much as ten times over the cost to construct the same project using Afghan techniques, standards, and materials. Absurdly, compliance with the FAR also undermined PRT efforts to fight corruption and fraud by requiring the PRT to compensate corrupt or incompetent Afghan contractors when the PRT canceled contracts with them. This created the perverse incentive for the PRT to focus on smaller, less expensive projects that the commander could approve and control himself, rather than on larger projects that would have better supported the ANDS and long-term economic development.11

Coordinating development with NGOs was particularly frustrating for the PRTs. PRTs were generally most successful in regions where poor security precluded NGOs from operating, making the PRTs the only game in town (State 2006). In principle, as security improved and NGOs moved into an area, PRTs should have been able to reduce their development activities and focus more on security sector reform. They would continue

11 Telephone interview, Nuristan PRT CO.
to support both the development and governance missions by participating in the PDC and development of the PDP and helping to identify and fund development projects that could be undertaken by UNAMA or NGOs. Many NGOs, in fact, worked closely with the PRTs, to their mutual benefit and to that of the Afghans. However, many others refused to cooperate or coordinate with the PRTs, for a variety of reasons.

Some objected on ideological grounds to the military’s involvement in development. They charged that what the military calls “humanitarian assistance” is driven not by altruism but by political and military strategic objectives, and that the military does not comply with development best practices, sacrificing sustainability and capacity-building for quick results that further the COIN effort (Dziedzic and Seidl 2005). American officials did not dispute the fact that military-led development efforts also further the goals of stabilizing the Afghan government and undermining support for the insurgency. Rather, they countered that the PRTs served development needs that would otherwise go unmet, either because civilian agencies did not have the capacity to respond to immediate needs or because NGOs could not meet the needs given the security environment. The DOD also did not dispute that the military lacked the training and expertise needed for development work, or that this resulted in costly mistakes. Yet the PRTs’ overall track record was quite good, and the incidence of poorly-implemented projects was comparable to that of NGOs (Dziedzic and Seidl 2005; U.S. Navy 2009a). Critics from the NGO world conveniently ignored the fact that the concept of exactly what “best practices” are is itself controversial in the development community, and that many NGOs also pursue political objectives outlined by the governments of donor nations (Stapleton 2007).

Other NGO personnel objected for the more practical reason that the military’s involvement in development for strategic purposes made all development and development workers targets for insurgents intent on destabilizing the government and delegitimizing the American and coalition presence. The concern was that PRTs blurred the lines between military and civilian development and assistance efforts, shrinking the “humanitarian space” in which NGOs have to work and calling into question their impartiality (Sedra 2005). Their fears were not unfounded. NGO workers were increasingly targeted as ISAF and the PRTs expanded their footprint after 2003, and many NGOs were forced to pull out of rural areas. The open cooperation between international military forces, the Afghan government, and the UN on development caused some NGOs to guard their independence fiercely, since being associated with stabilization efforts could put them at increased risk (Stapleton 2007).

Ideological and security concerns about cooperating with the military were behind the refusal of many NGOs to attend meetings of the PDC or participate in the development of the PDP, despite invitations to do so by governors (USIP 2009m). Many were unwilling to share information on their projects with the PRTs, leading to a duplication of effort and hampering efforts to build a comprehensive development picture. Lack of
communication also denied the PRTs the expertise of NGO personnel with extensive experience in Afghanistan, particularly knowledge of local culture, personalities, and drivers of conflict that could have significantly aided the PRTs’ development and governance missions and probably helped them to avoid costly mistakes (State 2006; Sedra 2005). Unfortunately, it also at times prevented the PRT from responding to threats to NGO workers in their area (Dziedzic and Seidl 2005).

Under these difficult circumstances, PRTs accomplished a great deal in terms of humanitarian and infrastructure development, building schools, clinics, roads, wells, irrigation projects, police headquarters, and government buildings, often with little oversight or direction from their chain of command. Unfortunately, the lack of vertical and horizontal coordination resulted in a great deal of inefficiency, confusion at all levels of the chain of command about the status of development, and sometimes costly mistakes that were counterproductive to the mission of improving security and enhancing governance.

**Cultural Terrain**

When the U.S. declared war on Afghanistan in 2001, few people in America knew anything about life in Afghanistan. Even at State and the DOD, knowledge and expertise was extremely limited. So it is not surprising that the PRTs faced a steep learning curve as they approached the development mission. Had they been somehow enlightened with the knowledge and understanding of Afghan culture that U.S. forces have gained over the last decade, they would have undoubtedly altered the focus of their development efforts in rural areas. A better understanding of the cultural terrain would also have helped them to better contend with the widely varying tribal and ethnic dynamics, and to alter their development efforts in order to reinforce the importance of local governance structures.

In any discussion or assessment of PRT development efforts in Afghanistan, the projects most often referred to are roads, schools, clinics, and wells. There is no doubt that building roads was one of the most critical and empowering projects that PRTs could pursue. They connected the provinces to Kabul and other population centers, and made it possible to get goods to markets that were previously inaccessible. Education was a high priority for local and provincial leaders, who often asked for schools to be built. Similarly, health care was almost non-existent outside of major cities, so clinics were in high demand. New schools and clinics were relatively quick and inexpensive to build, provided great photo opportunities for the PRT and the Provincial Governor, and brought a rush of hope, enthusiasm, and support for the PRT and the government. They also fit the U.S. narrative of the coalition forces bringing new freedoms and opportunity and better quality of life to the people of Afghanistan, helping to maintain domestic support back home. However, poor security often made travel outside of the local area dangerous, even on the new roads, and most people in rural Afghanistan were engaged in subsistence-level farming, with little extra to sell in a market. Schools and clinics were often built without consideration for whether the provincial and national government
had the human capacity to staff and support them, creating a sense of betrayal and making the central government look corrupt and incompetent when the buildings remained empty after they were built.

While there was certainly a great need for these projects, arguably what was needed most in rural areas was small-scale agricultural development to increase crop yield and improve storage capacity, so that villages could become self-supporting and have produce to take to markets via the new roads (Combat Studies Institute 2011; SOCOM 2012). Much of the institutional and traditional knowledge regarding farming techniques was lost with the destruction of the khans and tribal elders under the communists, and local capacities had atrophied further under the Taliban regime. Rural Afghans needed irrigation projects and assistance with the most basic farming techniques even more than they needed schools and clinics. Yet, in a country in which 80% of the population is involved in agriculture (in some provinces it was as high as 95%), agricultural development was largely ignored until 2005, and the PRTs were apparently unaware of a USAID program designed to rebuild agricultural markets (USIP 2009n; State 2006). USDA had minimal capacity to support the PRTs and no dedicated funding, and the first National Guard ADT did not deploy until 2008, more than six years into the reconstruction effort (Kemp 2011; USIP 2009f). The one area of development that did focus on agriculture was poppy eradication, which was a high priority for the U.S. But in many places, poppy eradication was a failure, because alternative agricultural development efforts were insufficient or because poppy was so much more lucrative than substitute crops. Where eradication was successful, it often had the unintended consequence of depriving locals of their livelihood; without an alternative, many joined the insurgency (Combat Studies Institute 2006; 2011; USIP 2009k).

A major factor that hindered development in the south was a poor understanding of traditional Pashtun culture, and the way in which development efforts fed the Taliban narrative of a war on traditional values in rural Pashtun areas. In these areas, most of them beyond the effective reach of the central government, the Taliban established shadow governments which provided services such as justice and education that lent some measure of stability to tribal life, even if it was at times harsh (USIP 2009d). The ability of the PRT to bring life-improving development – on a scale beyond the capacity of the Taliban – to these areas, particularly in the form of roads and other infrastructure, represented an asymmetric advantage over the Taliban (Kemp 2011). However, this type of development, which was designed to build support for the central government and increase connections between the provinces and Kabul, by its nature threatened the authority and autonomy of the traditional and fiercely independent rural tribes in the south. The fact that these projects also tended to advantage the more settled and urbanized groups and extend the modernizing influence of the center supported the Taliban narrative that these efforts were part of an American-led war on Islam and traditional tribal culture, a narrative that resonated with many in the rural south (TAC 2010). Similarly, the PRT emphasis on value-driven goals like education and expanding women’s rights, priorities for American leaders and domestic audiences, was often
unwelcome in these areas. Not only did these ideals threaten fundamental Islamic traditions, but they were far less important to many than the provision of basic necessities and predictable security (USIP 2009e).

As a result of this dynamic, PRT development efforts in the south in some ways helped to strengthen the insurgency. Taliban leaders in some places moved in after the construction of schools and installed their own teachers and curricula, excluding girls and extending their influence over the next generation of young men (USIP 2009c). Major projects like the upgrade of a power plant at Kajaki Dam in Helmund province that could extend the power grid to unserved areas generated fierce Taliban resistance, since connecting rural villages to the power represented a major extension of the modernizing influence of the center. The Taliban attacked not only the project itself, but also its supply lines and the workers employed by the projects, highlighting the inability of the central government to provide the security and stability it had promised (McKenzie and Brody 2011, Standifer 2014).

Lastly, the pervasiveness of low-level corruption in Afghan society plagued development efforts in all parts of the country. Corruption by government officials at all levels with influence over the PDP undermined efforts to use development to build legitimacy for the provincial and national government. At times, PRT commanders determined they were better off negotiating smaller projects directly with local leaders in order to circumvent corruption within the system the PRT itself was trying to implement. The limited ability of the PRT to effectively monitor all of the projects under its purview led to extensive fraud in the form of shoddy construction, substitution of inferior materials, incomplete projects, and skimming of funds by local contractors. Government office buildings funded by the Bamyan PRT became unusable after one winter when substandard plumbing and insulation caused pipes to burst, flooding the buildings (USIP 2009j). In 2009, as security conditions worsened, PRT and Brigade commanders began cancelling projects they could not effectively monitor, because without oversight corruption by contractors and local officials was rampant (U.S. Navy 2010; USIP 2009I). Paradoxically, efforts by the PRT to reduce or punish corruption by cancelling projects or marginalizing corrupt officials often created anger and frustration among the local populations and their leaders who had been promised these projects, ultimately damaging overall mission effectiveness.

Conclusion

The decade-long experiment in synchronized civil-military stability operations undertaken by the PRTs is difficult to characterize as simply a success or a failure. For every example of abject failure in one part of the country, there is an example of stunning success in another. Looking at the state of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of U.S. and international forces, however, it is clear that the PRT-led development strategy was unable to achieve the widespread economic and political development that U.S.

12 Telephone interview, Nuristan PRT CO.
officials had hoped would neutralize the insurgents, stabilize the country, and provide the foundation for the establishment of responsible and responsive government.

The inability of the PRTs – and the coalition forces more broadly – to achieve stability through economic and political development can be attributed to a wide array of factors, but most of them were a function of the lack of capacity needed to perform the mission, poor support and coordination, and a Western perspective that failed to grasp the intricacies, nuance, and importance of Afghan culture, history, and heritage. Insufficient numbers meant the PRTs could never cover the area of responsibility they were assigned, leaving the Taliban and other insurgents room to counter or undermine each gain they made in local villages. The lack of civilians experienced in development and government led to numerous mistakes by well-intentioned military leaders trying to further their mission objectives as best they could. Similarly, mistakes caused by poor coordination – vertically within the U.S. military and horizontally between the U.S. military, civilian agencies, the Afghan government, and coalition partners – consistently undermined efforts to win over the loyalty of the Afghan people and establish support for the Afghan government.

Perhaps most damaging, the lack of understanding of Afghan culture and society led military and civilian leaders at all levels to develop and execute strategies which were often counterproductive to their intended goals. They failed to align their expectations to the realities on the ground or to tailor their efforts and tactics to the unique needs and attributes of each province and each ethnic group. Instead, the PRTs and other military and civilian actors tried to apply Western organizational principles and standards, or techniques that had been successful in other parts of the country, without regard to the vast cultural and ethnic differences that separated Afghans from Americans and from each other. Particularly with regard to the ethnic Pashtuns in the south, they failed to comprehend the long history of decentralized authority and tribal autonomy, or to recognize that their efforts to develop modern infrastructure and enhance the capacity of the central government would threaten that autonomy and inadvertently feed the insurgency.

If the United States is going to successfully carry out a forward-leaning, engaged foreign and security policy that includes a significant effort to help foreign partners develop economically, politically, and militarily, then it must apply the lessons of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan in order to create the knowledge, capabilities, and mechanisms required to seamlessly integrate civilian and military efforts across a broad spectrum of conditions. This means continuing to increase the capacity of the civilian interagency, through the Bureau of Conflict and Stability Operations and the Civilian Response Corps, to respond rapidly and effectively to development needs in unstable regions of the world. It means the military needs to improve the training provided to deploying units, including courses, lectures, and exercises on development best practices, governance, working with NGOs, and cultural awareness for the region to which they are heading. The DOD should create a database of personnel, particularly in
the reserves, with leadership experience on PRTs who could be tapped to lead small civil-military teams elsewhere in the world on short notice if the need arose. Further, more mechanisms are needed to establish civil-military links at both the strategic and the tactical level, and to expose both sides to the capabilities and expertise each has to offer, in order to facilitate cooperation and mutual support at all levels in future stability operations.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the military needs to expand partnerships with academia and the development community, identifying ethnic, cultural, and regional experts who can develop training curricula for deploying units and perhaps work directly with them in an advisory capacity, in order to improve cultural awareness and language skills. Military deployments to permissive environments also offer incredible opportunities for research, creating an incentive for graduate students or academics to embed with military units the way that journalists now do in conflict zones. Greater effort should be made to extend similar opportunities to members of the interagency, who would gain experience both with the military and in their designated region of expertise or responsibility. Without the need for a security element in such environments, the U.S. could deploy small civil-military teams of a dozen, 20, or 30 people for a period of weeks or months if needed, or create a civilian capacity within deploying military units to lead or coordinate aspects of development that are more appropriately conducted by civilians. These initiatives would go a long way toward improving the ability of the civil-military apparatus to conduct coordinated, efficient, and effective development and other stability operations worldwide in support of American foreign policy objectives.
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INDUSTRY MODERNITY AND DEVELOPMENT
Abstract

Russia is an oil-cursed country whose economic health has been dependent on hydrocarbon prices. To hedge against such risks, in 2005, the government launched special economic zones (SEZs) to modernize and diversify its economy. In 2012, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development launched 25 clusters across the country to attract FDI. Of particular interest is the unheralded Kaluga region, 200 kilometers from Moscow with no natural resource endowments, which has become an unlikely success story. Its innovation and industrial cluster have attracted over $7 billion in investments between 2006 and the first half of 2013 – they have climbed from 48th place in foreign investment per capita in 2005 to the top few. This research paper examines whether Kaluga region has in fact outperformed other regions and if so, what factors played to its success. The argument is made that Kaluga has indeed outperformed other regions. The large part of its success is attributed to Governor Anatoly Artamonov and the local institutions that have together created an investment-friendly environment within a investment-risky country.

Key Words: clusters, competitiveness, Russia, special economic zones, economic development

Introduction:

Cluster-based industrial development was popularized by Michael Porter’s Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) and it refers to a particular type of an economic development that is achieved through clustering relevant economic entities geographically for the purpose of increasing productivity, reducing costs, and maximizing competitiveness. Lately, Porter’s theory came under heat due to his co-founded strategy consulting firm, Monitor Group, filing for bankruptcy (Denning 2012). In addition, Okinawa research and development cluster in Japan and in the Skolkovo project in Russia have fallen short of expectations (Wadhwa 2010). Some claim that with the rise of internet, growth of the service sector, proliferation of outsourcing practices among many other changes brought forth by globalization and the knowledge-based
economy, credibility in a location-centric development model are a thing of the past. Yet, Richard Florida (2002) has cogently established an argument that less has changed than commonly perceived; if anything, the so-called the 38 million strong creative class, which makes up 30 percent of the U.S. workforce, has become only more particular about geographic proximity and thus the axiom “geography is dead” proven false. High-tech firms have been clustering around San Francisco Bay Area, Austin and Seattle. Furthermore, as of 2013, the European Cluster Observatory’s Greenbook 2.0 counted 1,085 cluster projects worldwide. That is, the developing nations, particularly BRICS, whose economies are still largely driven by the manufacturing sector, are bringing renewed interest into cluster-based industrial development (Ketels, Lindqvist & Sölvell 2006). In fact, the world is converging as the gap in FDI inflow between the West and the emerging economies narrows. Based on the European attractiveness survey, if the gap between the most and the least attractive regions was between 63 percent (Western Europe) and 6 percent (Brazil) in 2005, in 2011 the spread was only between 38 percent (China) and 11 percent (Russia) (Johansson & Ivlev 2011).

Cluster-Based Industrial Development in Russia

A country of particular interest to this research is Russia. According to the research published by the Institute for Defense Analyses, “The country has a well-developed education system, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields, and proportionally graduates more scientists and engineers than most Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (on par with Sweden and Finland)” (iii). Among BRICs countries, Russia’s per capita GDP was the highest among BRIC countries in 2011 (Dierks & Van Der Plas 2013). High per capita GDP translates into a large consumer market for foreign investors. According to the 2013 World Bank report, Russia ranks 8th in nominal GDP. For example, Russia is one of world’s fastest growing markets for cars and is poised to supplant Germany as Europe’s largest market. In 2012, Russians bought 2.9 million cars. In 2011, the Russian pharmaceutical market was also among top ten major global markets as it placed 8th. There is still a lot of market potential since consumption of medicinal products per capita is three times lower than the average consumption in Europe or five times lower than the average consumption in the US (“Pharm Revolution.”2012).

At the same time, there are several roadblocks that have hindered Russia’s path to economic development: weak institutional governance, weak market mechanisms, loose intellectual property rights, and rampant corruption (Aslund 2007). Based on the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index, Russia’s governance has not significantly improved since 1996. Now it is ranked 127th in Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index. However, Aslund, Guriev & Kuchins (2010) have assessed that under President Putin, Russia has become only more corrupt.
Nonetheless, according to the 2013 CIA World Factbook, Russia ranks 16th having received over $550 billion in FDI as high risks also promise high returns. Russia ranks a distant 92nd place in the Doing Business rankings. Surveys show that the most negative investment factors were corruption and the bureaucracy; for emerging economies lagging behind the technological frontier, aging capital stock and unskilled labor force is of concern as well (Mashkina, Obukhova, & Seryogin, 2013).

**Cluster-based approach and Russia’s leadership**

Russia’s leadership, particularly during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, recognized that dependence on hydrocarbon exports is unsustainable long-term as evidenced by the 2008 global financial crisis during which Russian stocks shed $1 trillion. To hedge against such risks, in 2005, the government launched special economic zones (SEZs) to attract foreign investment and diversify its economy. The development of clusters has become a priority in the 2020 Strategy of Innovative Development confirmed in 2010 (Kutsenko & Meissner 2007). In 2012, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development launched 25 clusters across the country with a similar purpose. Same year, Russia also joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) after eighteen years of negotiations (longest in history). Membership promises new opportunities for foreign investment in sectors including banking, insurance, business services, telecommunications and distribution (Dierks & Van Der Plas 2013: 31). Porter’s study shows that this contract, however, addressed more copyrights and trademarks than patents (Porter et al 2007). It was estimated that Russia would gain about 7.2% of the value of Russian consumption in the medium term from WTO accession and up to 24% in the long run (Jensen, Rutherford & Tarr 2007). Reducing barriers to entry to foreign products and firms in Russia has had positive effect on economic performance for firms and industries that are closer to the technological frontier but have negative effect for firms and industries that are farther to

Cluster-based approach was deemed an effective ways to achieve modernization and innovative development. As a result, the first national cluster program was launched in 2012. The Ministry of Economic Development launched 25 clusters in two groups. Fourteen clusters are supported with annual 1.3 billion ruble (325 million Euros) subsidies over the next five years starting in 2013 (Ibid). The other eleven clusters are supported by regional budgets, federal targeted programs, public companies and institutes of development and will need to make further improvements to receive federal subsidy (Smorodinskaya and Katukov 2014). The pilot clusters are largely divided into six categories (Kutsenko & Meissner 2007: 18):

- Nuclear and radiation technologies
- Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft, shipbuilding
- Pharmaceutical, biotechnology and medical industries
ITE and pharmaceutical sectors have received most federal support. There are seven clusters that focus on ITE and six that focus on pharmaceutical respectively. Eighteen clusters are located in the European part of Russia and only seven in the Asian. This is consistent with the capital distribution in Russia. These initiatives are still in early stages and have the possibility to change as the time progresses. For the success of these clusters, specificities of Russia’s regions need to be well understood and addressed. Developers need to be aware that Russia carries a Soviet legacy. The Soviet Union pursued its industrial development through territorial production complexes (TPC) that has been often been likened to clusters (Lenchuk & Vlaskin 2010). With sanctions projected to stay for the next several years, country’s ability for subsistence and creativity in pursuing economic development will be put to a test.

The Kaluga Cluster

Of particular interest to this research is the Kaluga cluster located 200 kilometers south of Moscow that has become an unlikely success story. Kaluga is an ancient city that dates back to the early 14th century. Its heydays came in the 18th and 19th centuries when paper and cloth manufacturing brought prosperity. A crucial mistake was made at the end of the 19th century when the city rejected to accept the railroad come through the city; since then the rail was built there (Eidelman 2007). Kaluga is not statistically representative of urban Russian cities but the city is demographically or economically representative of other mid-sized cities in Central Russia (Zavisca 2005). The region boasts relatively high FDI, low unemployment and higher than average wages in comparison to the rest of Western Russia (Morris 2011). This is a remarkable achievement for a region that has no strong natural resource endowments and still has been able to attract FDI (Dierks & Van Der Plas 2013). Partially, at least, the city benefits from close proximity to Moscow, which accounted for over 50 percent of the country’s credit institutions and FDI in 2007 (Kompalla 2009).

The city came to prominence in the early 2000s after it began to attract foreign investors. In 2012, it was selected as one of fourteen regional clusters to receive federal subsidy for its sustained growth. It is no doubt that at the heart of an unheralded success story is now-Governor Anatoly Artamonov, who has fostered a culture and a sustainable institutional framework. Joerg Schreiber, president and managing director of Mazda Motor Russia claims, “Artamonov has a reputation for welcoming foreign business and for making Kaluga a special place – an exception.” (Crouch 2013). On the other hand, Kaluga’s minister of economic development, Ruslan Zalivatsky, cites their clearly established rules and rule-enforcing institutions for their success: 1). No isolating of
investors 2). No long processes 3). No bureaucracy 4). No restraints 5). No infrastructural risks 6). No hidden costs 7). No middle brokers. In practice, he established Kaluga Region Development Corporation, which oversees industrial parks under the Ministry for Economic Development and the Regional Development Agency, which oversees investment projects under the Ministry for Economic Development that have together minimized corruption and enabled the needs of investors to be met.

Figure 1: Foreign investments volume in the Kaluga region, bln. $

Cluster-based industrial development has proven to be relevant strategy for developing countries, such as China (Zeng 2011). The cluster-based industrial development model is a public-private partnership (PPP) and for countries marred by weak rule of law, property rights, high corruption, and underdeveloped industries such strategy can contribute to faster growth. This partnership is a way to share risks, which is important factor for risk-averse investors both domestic and international. Currently, the Russian government’s R&D has accomplished very little partnership with the private business sector and thus the benefits have been underutilized (Refer to Figure 2). Russia’s rate of patent applications by residents is above the OECD average (on par with the United Kingdom and France) but industry participation in R&D innovation activities, excluding technology adoption or imitation, is lower than all OECD economies (Institute for Defense Analyses). The Russian government is not lagging in R&D investment in comparison to other emerging economies, but evidently, its investments are rendering
little positive effect on the civilian economy. In fact, even the OECD has reported among its member countries, the government played a vital role in promoting innovation-driven growth and to do so, it established institutions that provided the legal and incentive frameworks (Fostering Public-Private partnership for Innovation in Russia: 10). With many multinational corporations and even non-governmental organizations having an annual budget greater than of many sovereign nations, it is all the more the case that under-developed countries need heavy governmental support whether in subsidies, grants, or close cooperation for growth. An in-depth case study on Kaluga Industrial Park, may offer a model that can be applied to other regions of Russia or even to other developing countries. Even the Ukrainian Prime Minister Azarov expressed that the Kaluga investment model could work in Ukraine ("Azarov Believes Kaluga's Investment Model Will Work in Ukraine." 2013).

Figure 2: Percentage Distribution of gross domestic R&D expenditures by source of funding, 2009

Figure 4. Percentage distribution of gross domestic R&D expenditures by source of funding, 2009.


First, it is important to qualify different types of clusters based on main initiators (Cisco IBSG):

- Organic clusters: clusters formed around favorable access to inputs, whether natural, man-made or virtual (e.g. natural resources in Vorkuta).
- University-based clusters: clusters formed around research center of universities (e.g. University of Illinois Research Park).
- Local government led cluster: clusters initiated by local authorities to attract investors (e.g. Alabama’s pitch for Hyundai plant through offering free infrastructure, funding for job creation and tax exemptions).
• Private sector led cluster: clusters located in joint partnership parks or developer initiative parks (e.g. shopping malls)

• Technology-based clusters: clusters creating competitive differential by developing new technologies (e.g. Boston high-tech).

• Triple helix cluster: Clusters that are formed in partnership with the government, business, and academic institution (e.g. Silicon Valley).

Kaluga’s industrial parks come closest to triple helix clusters and local government led clusters. Kaluga industrial cluster works closely with Governor Artamonov. He established Kaluga Region Development Corporation, which oversees industrial parks under the Ministry for Economic Development and the Regional Development Agency, which oversees investment projects under the Ministry for Economic Development that have together minimized corruption and enabled the needs of investors to be met. Kaluga region has 28 institutes of higher education that produce 39,000 students; there are 26 specialized secondary education centers that produce 14,000 students; there is also a training center for professionals in automotive industry set up by the foreign automaker that trains approximately 2000 workers annually.

Another important classification to clusters is the strategy that they follow. There are largely four classifications in Russia (A Cluster-Based Strategy for Russia’s Innovative Development):

• Innovative: these clusters have an objective of building innovative models that generate sustainable competitive advantage (e.g. biotechnology, nanotechnology, information communication technology).

• Industrial: these clusters have an objective of producing competitive quality products (e.g. automotive industry, manufacturing, aviation).

• Dynamic: these clusters have an objective of overhauling current industry practices to meet higher standard production (e.g. textile industry)

• Restructuring: these clusters have an objective of creating complete production cycles from raw materials to deep processing (e.g. agriculture and food industry)

Kaluga industrial park with its automotive and pharmaceutical clusters would fall under industrial and innovative classifications respectively. Kaluga industrial park comes in a stark contrast with the Skolkovo innovation centers. While the former did not receive any significant governmental financial support, the latter received a government pledge of $15 billion between 2013-2020 (Filatova 2013). Although it is too early to make sweeping generalizations, many experts from Russia and abroad have criticized Skolkovo project arguing that a country behind the technological frontier, like Russia, need first to become competitive in imitating new technologies and processes before venturing on to innovative projects (Connolly 2011). Perhaps, due to the level of
disparity and difficulty, Skolkovo project is falling short of expectations, while Kaluga’s imitative practices are garnering much praise.

Investors can minimize their risks by concentrating their resources into distinct geographical territories where they can realize competitive advantages. Russia has three macro-regions that function as the “outlets” of its country: the Northwest Region, Southern Region (Azov and Black Sea territories), and the Far East (Graham, Oding & Welfens 2005: 233). So far, it is the Northwest Region, closest to Europe and home to most of Russia’s population and capital that has attracted most investment and thus achieved most significant development. As much as 80 percent of Russia’s capital is concentrated in the city of Moscow and its regions (Schorsch 2008).

Governor Artamonov established 6 guiding principles to minimize the risks for foreign investors and maximize the ease of doing business in Kaluga: 1). No isolating of investors 2). No long processes 3). No bureaucracy 4). No restraints 5). No infrastructural risks 6). No hidden costs 7). No middle brokers. In practice, Artamonov established Kaluga Region Development Corporation, which oversees industrial parks under the Ministry for Economic Development and the Regional Development Agency, which oversees investment projects under the Ministry for Economic Development that have together minimized corruption and enabled the needs of investors to be met.

Artamonov’s model, at a closer look (Figure 3), is not particularly extraordinary to other initiatives. Its execution comes primarily through two institutions: Kaluga Region Development Corporation, which and the Regional Development Agency. The Kaluga administration provides subsidy, ensures the rule of law, and provides the land plots for enterprise. Banks provide liquidity that the Kaluga Region Development Corporation uses to finance industrial parks.
In conclusion, it was not the intention of this paper to offer Kaluga case as something that can be replicable anywhere. Based on further research, Kaluga’s unheralded success had a legitimate grounds for it. It had a responsible government and institutional framework committed to modernizing its economy and it struck success with the federal government when it was selected as one of the SEZs and cluster initiatives.
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Abstract

In the past 25 Cold War era years have witnessed a significant increase in the amount of, and access to information, due to increasing globalization enabling disparate and affordable communication tools and methods but also in part due to and through a diffusion and multiplicity of actors. Information access has depreciated the ability of governments to determine when and what kind of information citizens have access to. IR scholars such as Powell, Huckfeld, Milner, applying game theoretic assumptions of (as)symmetric and (in)complete information, have hypothesized that actors with complete information are as equally likely to benefit as they are to make decisions that negatively influence their welfare.\(^{13}\) One of the effects of access to information has been to challenge government control of the state, and the use of tools of communication to articulate opposing views especially in autocratic and semi-autocratic states. In ethnically divided societies, access to information can be used to disseminate hate speech (for example, Kenya in 2007 and Rwanda in 1994) or to articulate common positions, improving the conditions for governance and cohesion and making governments more responsive. This research reviews the arguments on the benefits and

constraints that access to information has produced in such countries. Then, using a quantitative research design and applying it to African countries, it examines the relationships between access to information in multi-ethnic countries and factors of state stability such as state fragility, ethnic war, corruption, democracy and executive selection. The results show that in multi-ethnic countries, increase in information flow correlates positively with democratization, and with competitiveness in participation, but negatively with state fragility, ethnic war, corruption and military expenditure. The findings demonstrate that contrary to hypotheses, increase in access to information supports democratization and stability even in ethnically divided countries.

**Key words:** ethnicity, democracy, globalization, information, social and economic development, media, failed states, information

**Introduction**

Some of globalization’s most significant positive outcomes – as well as innovations – have been realized in the Global South, and more specifically, in Africa. Whereas some innovations have followed the adage that “necessity is the mother of invention” – limited fixed telephone infrastructure for example has led to one of the fastest and highest rates of mobile phone penetration in countries like Kenya and Nigeria – technology has also helped to drive alternative systems. The Mobile Money Transfer platform is an innovative example of the ability to reach the unbanked without creating new physical banking infrastructure and facilitating remote access from inaccessible areas, transact business directly and on some level, decrease the potential for corruption. Other uses have included, for instance, getting real-time market and price data, texting medical prescription refills and sending patients medication reminders, agricultural extension work and advice, among others.

Technological revolutions in communication have led to opening up democratic space. While technological developments may have more impact in countries with systematic infrastructure development planning and implementation, adoption of technology has challenged African governments in new ways, often difficult to control, manage and/or develop legislation for. Opportunities and constraints to rapid technological modernization are evident: lack of telephone infrastructure has contributed to limitation in internet access to businesses and individuals, stifling creativity and commerce. The limited infrastructure limits data providers to expensive satellite networks as opposed to more affordable, stable infrastructure (e.g. fiber optic cables). Only now are new housing projects being wired for fiber optic internet access. Constraints imposed by telecommunications companies based on prior national policies (such as the absence of credible credit tracking and verification mechanisms, fixed street addresses or personal identification numbers similar to western countries) have generally led to pre-paid, credit top-up mobile phone system provision. Even as individuals access tools of
modernity, there are still constraints to their ability to participate in modern global economics.

Whether Africa is merely a beneficiary of or a viable contributor in the globalization process is still a question that many continue to grapple with. Mavhunga notes the underrepresentation of scholarship on Africa's contributions to technology, writing that "in the narratives of globalization, Africa appears as a technological and cultural artifact" (10); and that "so insignificant is Africa in the globalization narrative that...prominent scholarship could easily talk about 'the world' while saying nothing at all about Africa" (10) and the subsequent argument that "if Africa's contribution to these things that mark world time really mattered or existed, wouldn't its historians, anthropologists, political scientists, engineers and scientists have written about it already?" (10-11).

It is important to consider what these developments entail – particularly globalization – and how they have affected the global south and more specifically, African countries. Globalization has found many definitions, almost all of them involving compression of time, space and facilitating more interactions across these domains and across peoples. Begnao, Gonzalez, Harder, Hawkesworth and MacDonald write that "perhaps the broadest definition construes globalization as 'the spatial extension of social relations across the globe'" (3) and are exemplified by The Roman Empire, European colonialism and 20th-century capitalist imperialism (ibid).14

This research proceeds as follows: in the subsequent section, it outlines the theoretical frameworks that inform this study, discusses aspects of game theory and the problems of complete information, and reviews how democracy and ethnicity have interfaced with access to technology. It further explores how globalization and modernization has failed to diminish the negative effects of ethnic identity; in some cases, communication and access to information and their platforms has provided an otherwise unavailable avenues to promote ethnic divisions since governments have diminished control. The research identifies gaps in literature, outlines the research design and the hypotheses, then discusses the findings and conclusions.

14 Other scholars, for example Hawkesworth, show the different definitions of globalization, including the Eurocentric view (beginning in the 15th Century and mostly involving European expansion, imperialism and colonization), as well as globalization linked to modernity and enlightenment ("the relationship between reason and progress"), emphasizing reason and science that led to the development of science and technological innovation, industrialization, global trade networks, democratization - while others see it as restricted to the past three decades - "death of distance" with interrelated economic, political, cultural and technological transformations, including the phone, TV, internet and transportation (Hawkesworth, 2005: 4-6)
Conceptual frameworks

One of the areas in which the information technology revolution has wrought the greatest change is in the area of communication and availability of information through the internet and social media platforms. Increasingly, information is available on devices such as phones, tablets, radio, and internet and high-subscription social media such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. The increased access to information has potential to improve communication between individuals and governments, but also diminishes the ability of governments to control content in a way that potentially undermines democratic participation.

In addition to other social and economic challenges, African - and indeed Global South/Emerging Economies that are almost uniformly post-colonial, ethnically heterogeneous societies, struggle with multiple identities and contested allegiances. These range from allegiance to the geographical and juridical state to allegiance to the smaller, ethnically homogenous nations. These identities are further magnified and subdivided by the processes of globalization, often leading to conflict. While Shetler argues that, per Laitlin's 2003 findings that "heterogeneity in and of itself is not a predictor of violence" (2010: 639), colonialism affected identities and continues to have outcomes to date: "the colonial formulation of Luo identity has contributed to violent conflict" (639). In post-colonial realities, countries began implement what Tran and Walter identify as policies to "encourage economic development...foster national integration and preserve and revive ethnic minority culture" (2010: 484).

Ethnic conflict has been one of the sources of pessimism about Africa’s overall potential and progress in social, economic and political development. Shelter writes that "a number of empirical surveys on a global level clearly demonstrate that ethnically diverse societies are more commonly associated not only with conflicts, but also with slowed economic development, political corruption and lack of security" (2010: 643). Such conflicts have persisted through and after colonialism as was witnessed in Kenya’s 2007 Post Election Violence (PEV). While ethnicity's negative impact on politics is not a particularly African problem, Szeftel argues that "politics all over Africa - and nearly all over the world - has a strong ethnic component" (1994: 185). However, ethnicity, as he and other scholars find, "is perhaps the most important influence on third world social and political systems, inflicting discrimination on minorities, undermining order and development and even putting the survival of some states at risk" (185).15

15 see also Welsh, 1996 - on boundaries and the formation of new post-colonial nations; Arthur 2009; and Londregan, Bienen and van de Walle, 1995 - on ethnicity, stability and leadership transitions.
Over time and the life of especially African states, other forces have impacted the state, its foundations, stability, politics and in the case of ethnically divided polities, ability to cohere particulars given their prodigious beginnings. Globalization has been thought to challenge the legitimacy of the state especially as the purveyor of information, but it is not evident that globalization, liberalization and availability of information and communication mechanisms so inherent in globalization have had a positive effect on especially ethnically divided societies. While in western democracies the role of and availability of information has (had) the potential to strengthen democratic processes by making information on campaigns, politicians’ positions on issues, voting records, by calling representatives and by petitioning government officials through several mechanisms afforded by information technology and to also mobilize support or opposition to legislation unfavorable to their preferences. However, it is not clear what such information technology revolution has done in developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan African countries particularly with regard to democratic processes.

One would surmise that the effect of globalization and availability of information should be positive – after all, Dahl (1971)’s definition of democracy hinges individuals' freedom to formulate preferences, to signify such preferences and third, to have the preferences weighed equally in the conduct of government (1971: 2-3). In his expanded criteria, Dahl argues that democratization rests on citizens having the freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, right to compete for support, alternative sources of information, eligibility for public office, free and fair elections, institutions for making gov’t and having policies depend on votes (1971: 6-7). Globalization facilitates “alternative sources of information”, and together with (complete) information, one expects that (electoral / democratic) governments will be more responsive and that citizens will be exposed political processes such as legislation, and will therefore better coordinate their social and economic development needs despite their ethnic differences.

**Game Theoretic approach: actors and complete information**

Game theory is “a theory of strategic interaction… a theory of rational behavior in social situations in which each player has to choose his moves on the basis of what he thinks the other players' countermoves are likely to be” (Harsanyi, 1985: 292). Game Theory and the several strategies therein have often been useful in understanding strategic decisions, solving dilemmas of common interests and dilemmas of common aversions. It is especially useful in determining how actors make their decisions – in this case, elections – which shape the trajectory and options a country selects. This research also considers

“incomplete information”, of which Harsanyi argues that “the players may lack full information about the other players' (or even their own) payoff functions, about the physical or the social resources, about the strategies available to other players (or even to themselves), about the amount of information the other players have about various
aspects of the game, and so on" (1985: 293).

If actors in ethnically divided societies had complete information on motivations, processes, intentions and future outcomes of governmental actions, would they behave differently? Given that politics (particularly political parties) in ethnically pluralistic societies is often based on the parties themselves, but that the parties are in turn formed based on – and reflect – ethnic divisions, government often becomes a tribal affair. Examining political processes – particularly the role of complete information and actors' preferences is helpful in determining how information changes (or does not) actors' choices, and the extent to which availability of information - albeit incomplete - has not correlated with better governance, political stability and decrease in ethnic conflict.

Tarimo captures the essence of the dilemma that pervades many African countries and their interaction with government, by illustrating individuals' choices, beliefs and options. Tarimo (2009) discusses some of the challenges that Kenya faces in developing and stabilizing the modern state given the ethnic divisions: "because of the ethnic competition for scarce economic resources and political power, each ethnic group tends to fight to have a president from their group. For them, the president will loot the state for his ethnic group" (581). Precedent has often shown this to be the case, beginning shortly after independence where minority groups that had joined the fight for independence found themselves dispossessed through the apparatus of the state post-independence. They have the expectation then, that should they occupy the highest institutions of political power, they have access to the capability to leverage the state's resources for their communal (or personal) social and especially economic development. Tarimo's arguments echo those of Mbiti, who writes that:

"ethnic identity derives its foundation from combined memories of the past and common expectation. Many people have lived and continue to lead their lives within the framework of an ethnic group. When a person is in difficulties, it is normal for this person to call for help from the ethnic community to which he or she belongs. In urban areas ethnic identity is appealed to when people are in need of financial support and political support. For many people ethnic identity stands as a symbol of communal solidarity and security. Ethnic identity, be it in rural or urban areas, remains a powerful force to reckon with, although it varies like temperature, from time to time, depending on prevailing political circumstance..." (1970: 102)

This is the problem of prior – perhaps incomplete – information on the purposes of the state, which has been signaled in the colonial and post-colonial states. Starkly differing from the smaller units before colonialism, which had the capacity (not necessarily the record of) responsiveness to their members, the juggernauts created by the Berlin Conference in 1885, and that became the colonial units, did not exist or function in the interests of the colonized. As such, the first instance of a modern, coherent state is
drawn from the colonial experience, and the second instance in post-independence states.
There is also a practical matter of the character of post-colonial states, which did not significantly depart from the colonial rule from whence they arose. On its form and function, Abubakar writes that the “African postcolonial state has generally been authoritarian, predatory, and absolutist in terms of monopolization of power by its rulers...this political class, which inherited power from the colonialist in Africa, regarded the state as the instrument of its will” (2001: 31). As such, the ethnically divided, modern African state has been unable to signal inclusion; its constituents perceive that control of political processes, institutions and state apparatus is a zero-sum game and thus do everything to capture such institutions. By signaling exclusion of all but those communities in power, it also provides information on the conditions under which individuals’ best interests are represented. This research hypothesizes that globalization has altered the relationship between the state and most of its constituents; instead, it has provided forces of ethnic division with avenues to even more potently challenge the state.

The Value of Complete Information

Elections are the most common methods of selecting representatives. As previously shown, in ethnically divided societies, elections can be a non-cooperative game, since every ethnic group has the incentive to capture the state's mechanisms for the pursuit of their (personal and) collective outcomes. Elections can therefore be seen as non-cooperative games - particularly between ethnic groups. Yet, despite the lack of cooperation among and between the different ethnic groups, the outcomes often mirror those of a stag-hunt: it is not always the case that political participation necessarily produces for either or any of the constituent groups the condition of Nash Equilibrium (the equilibrium where each player's strategy is optimal given the strategies of all other players - it exists when there is no unilateral profitable deviation from any of the players involved) given the other players' strategies (Campbell & Miller, 2007: 541). This is especially true given the hijack of state apparatus by elites.

One might posit a question whether elections are non-cooperative games, but it is evident that while they might be cooperative games with certain ethnic groups and with a candidate from one's own tribe, it is plausible that there might be better strategies, outcomes and achieving joint coherence and non-zero outcomes since countries aggregate most of their functions across the societal divide. To illustrate this, consider Nau & McCardle's definition of non-cooperative games: noncooperative game is a joint decision problem (wealth, happiness, social & economic development) in which each (voter) player’s strategies are lotteries (who wins the election) whose payoffs depend on the uncertain actions of his opponents (perhaps not electing a dictator). The player’s choice of strategy implies a preference for the chosen strategy over any alternative strategy, which can be given the operational
interpretation that he will accept a gamble in which the payoffs of any other available strategy are exchanged for the payoffs of the chosen one (425) (my brackets).

But how does the voter behave, and does the voter believe that voting for a member of a tribe over one who may have better policy prescription but from a separate tribe? Let's consider another concept: rational choice (rationality). Voters in ethnically divided societies are assumed to be rational individuals (GT: players), who follow the Bayesian rational subjective-expected-utility maximizers (Nau, 1992: 374). It is also fair to expect that the "players" are "involved in a set of events representing possible outcomes of a game and a market can be written for those events" (375). Nau further observes that players may communicate certain types of information including "players' utilities, probabilities and the structures of their strategy sets" (375), but players often do not know if their strategic choice will necessarily lead to the expected outcome (after all, even with a president from one's community in office, it is not clear that such communities are, as a bloc, better off than other communities. In an ethnically divided polity, elections offer one of the most compelling opportunities to achieve joint-coherence, and to obtain the best joint outcomes rather than individual outcomes.

Political processes in divided polities often approximate the conditions of "repeated two-person zero-sum games of incomplete information in which the information pattern is symmetric, that is, the information to both players is exactly the same" (Kohlberg & Zamir, 1974: 1040) through government control of the media and where capacity for free access to alternative information is constrained. Similarly, the players do not know (they may assume) the benefit or utility of their choice, although it still appears that they have incomplete information (Kajii & Morris, 1997: 1023).

**Gaps in Literature**

From the foregoing discussions, it is clear that most African countries are largely ethnically divided, that political competition in the form of elections in such countries often follows the contours of ethnic groups, as do political parties. Literature has also shown that while access to information is a critical, necessary condition for democracy, the role that access to information plays in such countries has not been sufficiently evaluated. Taken together with the notions that globalization affects attitudes, perceptions and reorganization of personal spaces, one might expect that access to information on government policies, activities, effects on the individual social and economic outcomes and also exposure to shared struggles, goals and experiences even with other members of different ethnic groups within the nation might mitigate the levels of disagreement and conflict in such countries. As such, access to information ought to produce outcomes that lead to government responsiveness, more understanding (of policies, procedures and overall, greater cooperation among and between the ethnic groups). Yet, African countries have continued to experience significant conflict, genocides, election violence and other ethnic-based issues. Ultimately, this research aims to determine the relationships between availability of
information (which is hypothesized to improve relationships and thus decrease conflict, contribute to increasing / stability of democracy, decrease corruption and hold the government more accountable. In the next section, test hypotheses are developed.

**Research Design**

While a mixed methods research design might offer more complete explanations in helping to understand why some countries with significant ethnic cleavages do not experience high levels of corruption or ethnic violence (for example, Tanzania), while others with no ethnic cleavages or with two tribes are wracked by conflict, several constraints limit this research to a quantitative data analysis. Data for this research is available when / where needed, and the appendix outlines the sources of the data (set). Several hypotheses are formulated and tested.

On the relationships between information technology, greater understanding and reduction in ethnic conflict, it is expected that access to information technology will lead to greater understanding among the disparate groups within a country, especially in articulation of nationalism, collective destiny and shared goals. However, when the country is ethnically fractured, the opposite may be true: individuals and groups who perceive the government to be corrupt and unresponsive to their needs may utilize information technologies as a way to articulate opposition (often armed, and therefore increased conflict) to the government and its policies.

Since it is not expected that government or its functionaries (except perhaps in the case of Rwanda and certainly not on a large scale) will utilize communication and information technologies to divide the country, there would be concerted efforts to unify the country and media would be used for this purpose. Consequently, it is expected that countries with increasing access to media and information technology will experience less ethnic conflict; however, this may be mitigated by high levels of corruption may lead to the citizens feeling that the government is not responsive, and therefore use information technology in ways that lead to conflict, including of the ethnic type.

**Hypotheses**

The following hypotheses are developed to test for relationships between the variables

H0: Increase in access to information technology has had no effect on ethnic conflict in African countries

Ha: Increase in access to information technology has led to an increase in ethnic conflicts in African countries

H01: Increase in access to information technology has no effect on the perception of
corruption in the country

Ha1: Increase in access to information technology decreases the perception of corruption in the country

H02: Increase in access to information technology has no effect on military expenditure in ethnically divided countries

H02: Increase in access to information technology correlates with increase in military expenditure in ethnically divided countries

H03: Increase in access to technology had had no effect on the level of democracy in African countries

Ha3: Increase in access to technology correlates with decrease in the level of democracy in African countries

Data/ssets

To examine the relationships between globalization (measured as flow of information through TV, internet and Newspapers) and other variables, such as ethnic fragmentation, competitiveness of participation (which is thought to be based on ethnic-based parties), and which in turn affect the level of democracy thus correlating with a higher probability of ethnic violence/ethnic wars occurring and other factors such as the perception that the perceived level of corruption (which often raises the stakes of getting one's tribesperson elected since prior "knowledge" and expectations show that the presidency (and government) can be leveraged for personal and tribal gain, and in turn raising the probability of spending more money on the country's military so that the government maintains a military readiness in part to suppress dissent, data was culled from several sources and compiled into the Globalization and Ethnic Conflict Dataset.

The following are the sources of data: from the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR), Polity IV Data (Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2013), specifically the ETHWAR variable\(^\text{16}\) and the Polity IV (Annual Time-Series, 1800-2013) data, specifically the Polity2, SFINDEX (state fragility index) and ParComp (participation

competitiveness)\textsuperscript{17} and the country name variables. From the World Bank Data\textsuperscript{18} (World Development Indicators), the Military Expenditure as a percentage of GDP variable is isolated for African country. The INFOFLOW – variable denoting the Flow of Information (TV, Internet, Newspapers) used to measure the extent to which individuals have access to modern means of communication is derived from the KOF Globalization Index, specifically variable group b(ii)\textsuperscript{19}. From the CIA World Factbook\textsuperscript{20} the number of tribes in each country is computed based on the linguistic groups (these generally equal the ethnic groups identified in the "society and people" section). The Corruption variable is sourced from the Transparency International dataset.\textsuperscript{21}

**Regressions, results & findings**

Using SPSS, the first (omnibus) model, which takes the State Fragility Index (SFI) as the variable that measures the (internal) pressures exerted by groups contesting a state’s authority in a multi-ethnic state (and thus the coherence of a state given the competing pressures), all the variables (except for ethnic war – which has far fewer observations) the omnibus model is constructed (linear regression statistics with SPSS). The findings of the omnibus model show that the Omnibus model has an adjusted R-Square of .729, which means that the model explains about 73 percent of the total variation of the response data about the average. Contrarily, the adjusted R-Square of the omnibus model using the ethnic war as the dependent variable is a paltry 0.011, meaning that the model explains less than 1 percent of the variation in the data around the mean. This is possibly produced by the few instances in which the disagreements within a state have produced outright war, as opposed to the less stringent measures of states fragility. In this second model, only the INFOFLOW variable is statistically significant, while in the


omnibus model with SFINDEX as the dependent variable, the coefficients for information (globalization), democracy (POLITY2), participation competitiveness and corruption are statistically significant at the 95, 97 and 99 percent confidence intervals. The table of correlations shows no multicollinearity: none of the independent variables appear to be predicted by the other independent variables and none of the IVs have a correlation matrix > .702.

Using the Automated Linear Model function of the SPSS software, the model confirms previous findings: with the SFINDEX as the dependent variable and using the forward-stepwise model selection method, the adjusted R-square is .647; the model explains about 65% of the variation in the data around its mean. In the "predictor importance" statistics, INFOFLOW is shown as the most important predictor at 0.66; corruption and competitiveness of participation (Parcomp) are also important predictors of state fragility. Further, in this automated model, flow of information, corruption, competitiveness of participation, year, level of democracy and military expenditure as a percentage of the GDP are statistically significant; all but military expenditure and year are negatively signed, indicating a negative relationship with access to information.

Other results from the model are quite interesting. State Fragility Index score (which is calculated as the sum of the Effectiveness Score and the Legitimacy Score with 25 points possible) shows that as the state becomes less fragile (more cohesive), political competitiveness increases – this is contrary to what might be expected especially in ethnically divided countries. The results also show a positive correlation between more unitary states and better governance: as a state’s fragility index score decreases, the TI CPI score increases (the higher the score, the less corrupt the country). It appears then, that unitary states reap other benefits (or are less corrupt and therefore less fragile).

With regard to the primary hypothesis on how availability of information affects the fragility of a country, the results show that as access to information increases, the level of state fragility decreases. Contrary to what one might expect, by itself, availability of information does not necessarily correlate to higher state fragility even controlling for the number of tribes. It is plausible that when used properly, diverse sources and availability of information can decrease the probability of ethnically divided communities to find common ground rather than resort to military actions. On the other hand, countries without access to information (or with limited access thereto) show higher levels of fragility (again, here it is not clear whether they have less access to

22 Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole. “State Fragility Index and Matrix 2013.” Center for Systemic Peace. Accessed on 3/10/2015 from: [http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFImatrix2013c.pdf](http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFImatrix2013c.pdf). Effectiveness Score is calculated as follows: Effectiveness Score = Security Effectiveness + Political Effectiveness + Economic Effectiveness + Social Effectiveness (13 points possible); Legitimacy Score = Security Legitimacy + Political Legitimacy + Economic Legitimacy + Social Legitimacy (12 points possible). The higher the score, the more fragile the state is, and the lower the score, the more cohesive (less fragile) the state is.

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information precisely because they are fragile and therefore do not have the proper infrastructure to facilitate information flow due to ongoing conflict).

Other results support the expectations that fragile states are likely to have constraints that lead them to have negative outcomes for their citizens. The relationship between state fragility and levels of democracy is as expected: countries that are more stable have a higher polity4 score, that is, they are more democratic. One might conclude then, that democratic countries are less likely to be fragile precisely because contested issues in the polity can be managed through the democratic process. On the other hand, there is a positive correlation between state fragility and military expenditure; one might expect that more fragile states need to spend more on their militaries in order to suppress dissent and insurgencies (unless too, they are fighting other countries) while more cohesive states that are also likely to be democratic and less corrupt spend less on their militaries - and can allocate more resources to other social expenditure.

Conclusions

The results of this study have shown that the mere fact of a country being ethnically divided does not by itself contribute to, or correlate with, ethnic wars, conflict or state failure. Indeed, there was no statistically significant relationship between ethnic diversity and state failure. The p-values for the year and ethnic diversity with state fragility as the dependent variable were not statistically significant (7.8E-19 and 3.5E-01) and the adjusted R-square for the particular model is 0.063669374 (model explains approximately 6% of the variation). However, other negative factors within a polity correlate in predictable ways with state failure. While the results do not necessarily show whether state failure, for instance, comes about due to corruption, or whether excess corruption contributes to a state failing. Predictably, countries with greater openness in access to information are less likely to experience state fragility, and countries with more access to information have a higher polity2 score – the level of democracy – than states that do not. One possible explanation for this is that since access to information is one of the prerequisites to democracy, such states are more likely to resolve their issues peacefully and tolerate opposing views. Such countries are also more likely to be democracies and therefore offer better opportunities for pacific settlement of disagreements than autocracies. Predictably, corruption and state failure correlate positively; increase in one leads to an increase in the other.

These results affirm what scholars have previously argued; that ethnicity does not necessarily imply conflict. While “ethnic and religious identities are not abstractions that can be wished away” (Abubakar 2001: 32) and often the “ethnic identities are ‘politicized’ by ruthless politicians to serve their political and economic ends” (32), better resource allocation regardless of the ethnic group membership, much as might be the case in a democracy, may mitigate the potential conflict that the body politic feels and that makes it inevitable that conflict seeks to address the marginalization from the processes of development that individuals feel. It is also clear that the function of the
state, when properly leveraged and used not as a sanctioned way to loot the state resources, but to provide equal opportunity, do not have to result in conflict that causes state failure.

Further complicating issues, the perception that state apparatus can and are often used (and their primary role often considered to be) leveraging state resources for the benefit of an individual or a tribe or both, adoption of democratic processes often leads to parties based on ethnic group membership rather than ideology. As such, in multi-ethnic societies, larger tribes, by their sheer numbers, can monopolize the presidency – and by extension, the government. This has the potential to lead to conflict with ethnic undertones, and where only two major or a limited number of ethnic groups exist, genocide *a la* Rwanda. Still, there are countries that have navigated these issues successfully, precisely because members of smaller ethnic groups held the apparatus of power. Londregan, Biene and van de Walle note as much, writing that “leaders from small ethnic groups such as

Nyerere in Tanzania or Mobutu in Zaire or Gowon in Nigeria had advantages precisely because they did not come from large or dominant groups and were thus nonthreatening or could act as ‘balancers’” (1995: 2). After all, it must be remembered that politics are, as Easton argued, “those interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society” (Smith 2005: 9) and a society that is bound together by boundaries, history and nationalism finds it incumbent on them to find mutual accommodations, ethnicity notwithstanding.
Bibliography


Appendix 1: Data and Variables

The Globalization and Ethnic Conflict Dataset was constructed from several existing databases, and has the following variables: COUNTRY, YEAR, ETHWAR, INFOFLOW, SFINDEX, POLITY2, PARCOMP, CORRUPT-TI, TRIBES and MILEXP%GDP.

The following are the variables and their measurement intervals:

**Country:** 53 African countries are included in the data. South Sudan, which became independent in 2011, is not included (inclusion of South Sudan would increase the countries to 54)

**Year:** The data covers the years 1990 to 2012. This corresponds with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the beginning of the 3rd wave of democratization and the acceleration of the latest phase of globalization.

**Ethwar:** This variable is derived from Polity IV data (By Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers through INSCR and the Center for Systemic Peace). Ethwar is coded for the Magnitude score of episode(s) of ethnic warfare involving that state in that year Scale with the following scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes.

**Infoflow:** this denotes Flow of Information, the variable selected for the communication aspect of globalization and refers to access to TV, Internet and Newspapers). It is derived from the Swiss KOF Globalization Index, variable b (ii), with a scale of 0 - 100.

**SFINDEX - State Fragility Index - from Polity IV data (State Fragility Index and Matrix, 1995-2013)**

**Polity2 - level of democratization, from Polity IV data, with scores ranging from -10 Parcomp - competitiveness of participation" with a value of 3 (factional), which the codebook further defines as "[p]olities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas" (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers)

**Corrupt-TI:** This is the Transparency International computed Corruption Perception Index

– TI-CPI for African countries

**Tribes:** This is the (alternate) ethnic factionalization index (computed from CIA World Fact Book) based on an aggregate between language groups and ethnic groups

**Milexp%GDP:** This is the variable for a country’s military expenditure as a percentage of its GDP. It was extracted from the World Bank Word Development Indicators (WDI).
### Appendix 2: Tables and Figures

#### Table 1: Omnibus Model Table of Correlations

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<th>PARCOMP</th>
<th>CORRUPTT</th>
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#### Table 2: Omnibus Model Summary

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a. Predictors: (Constant), MILEXPGDP, POLITY2, TRIBES, YEAR, INFOFLO, PARCOMP, CORRUPTT

b. Dependent Variable: SFINDEX
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*Dependent Variable: SFINDEX*

**Fig. 1: ALM Step-wise Model Fit**
Introduction:

In this paper I analyze the strategies and policies that, in the 21st century, are most likely to produce the greatest gains in rural development and in national food security. To do so, first I establish the broad contours of the contemporary development policy context, focusing on the mounting hurdles to making gains in rural living standards and food security in recent decades. This is followed by examination of some of the key strategies that hold the greatest potential to generate increasing success at achieving food security and rural development progress. Here I focus especially on the importance of keeping smallholders on their land, and supporting their efforts to produce surplus food harvests; expansion of state-supported farmer outreach and agricultural extension programs; the ‘spreading out’ of industrial projects throughout the countryside; the provision of hard-copy land ownership documents; and the restoration of annual producer pricing supports. In addition, I underline the importance of rural development strategies that leave undisturbed -- while building on the ramparts of -- already-existing village-based social capital networks.

In general, while acknowledging that developing economies are increasingly and inextricably immersed in the broader global economy, it is suggested that the more that rural economies are able to provide smallholders with legal assurances of land tenure and to support them with infrastructural inputs, the greater the likelihood of making advances in rural development and food security. Given the acknowledged immersion of agriculturalists in global markets, but also the unpredictable and frequent changes in the purchase prices for food products in global markets, it is crucial to aim for rural development policies that facilitate the ability of farmers to remain on their own lands and to produce on-farm surpluses that can be traded or sold locally and on national markets.
Development Policy Context

In the past two decades, throughout the developing world, the hurdles in achieving rural development gains and national food security became increasingly imposing, including the following factors (among others): over-population (to the point that rural regions and even entire nations can no longer feed themselves); reduction in the size of arable land available as a consequence of drought and climate change in many parts of the world (limiting the ability of rural farming regions to achieve food self-sufficiency); further reductions of land use by smallholders due to the impact of privatization reforms; fluctuating world market prices of food crop purchase prices (which in turn also affects the sale prices of food crop exports); and limitations in travel infrastructure capacity in the wake of state fiscal decline in many countries (referring here to poor roads and an inadequate railroad system, which impede the potential for getting rural food harvests to cities, much less to ship such foods overseas).

At the same time, the structural adjustment policies imposed by the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s proved particularly harmful for a number of reasons, including: reductions in government spending on agricultural price supports; reduction in the provision of direct agricultural extension services to farmers; reduction in marketing assistance; and reduction in the provision of social services (health, educational, transportation, agronomic training) in rural areas. Thus, by the 1990s, millions of small farmers experienced a reduction in annual income, less food security in low-income rural areas, less overall national food security in many countries, and higher rates of social and economic inequality between large-scale (already-wealthy) farmers and the peasantry. By the start of the 21st century, income decline among smallholding farmers would mean that approximately one-sixth of the world’s populace, or 1.089 billion people, would be categorized as very poor (earning less than $1 per day) or poor (less than $2 per day).

In many respects, the promise of agronomic science, with its remarkable advances in farming technology and in the quality of on-farm inputs such as crop fertilizer and genetically modified crop seeds have been too often contradicted by practical difficulties. These have included not having enough rural infrastructure to support the ‘green’ technologies, and governments focusing only on providing large corporate farms with the modern hybrid seeds rather than widely distributing them to smallholders -- thereby effectively widening the income gap in rural areas. Yet an additional problem has been that while agronomic harvest yields rose significantly in targeted portions of the countryside in many countries, those production gains were too often

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overwhelmed by substantial increases in the rural population (relative to available foodstuffs after harvests).  

Moreover, in the 2000s, millions of small farmers experienced ever-greater intensification of political and economic pressure to leave their landholdings. Here I refer not only to the privatization of many rural land areas, now opened up to the free market, making smallholders vulnerable to land purchases by external companies or investors – but also to rising global pressure to grow ever-greater quantities of corn, sugar and soy not for human consumption but for biofuel production. Some national governments (including, among many others, Brazil, the Philippines, Ethiopia and the Sudan) have sought to usher small farmers off their lands, which are then sold to private firms (both domestic and international) eager to establish mechanized mega-farms for biofuel crop production.  

While many of these ‘land grabs’ are being contested by local farmers, NGOs and activists and have not yet been consolidated, they do represent a threat to small farmer agriculture – and to food security – in rural areas in some developing countries. Moreover, the notion of clearing the land of smallholders to make way for intensified, mechanized agriculture does fit in with the older, traditional vision of ‘development’ as being generated by land commercialization and urban-based industrialization.  

Smallholders, Agronomy, and Rural Industrialization

Indeed, it tends to be taken for granted, based in part on the development experiences of already-industrialized nations (in Western Europe as well as Argentina, Chile, Japan, etc.) that transforming rudimentary smallholdings into large modernized farms with attendant rural to urban migration represents the ideal development model. Many countries, including Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the Philippines and elsewhere continue to pursue this classic development strategy, with decidedly mixed (at best) results. But other nations, beginning in the last quarter of the 20th century, opted for an alternative development model in the quest to achieve rural development and national food security: Here the focus has been on keeping millions of smallholders on their farms; providing them with land rights; encouraging them to grow both food crops and cash crops; supporting them with agricultural extension services -- while at the same time spreading industrialization investments throughout various parts of the countryside rather than concentrating them in large cities.


This alternative rural development model recognizes that despite rapid land losses by peasants and small farmers in the wake of large-scale rural-to-urban migrations and efforts by many governments to consolidate farmland into giant mega-farms that can be sold to agricultural corporations, it is still the case that some two billion people – most of whom are poor – live in rural areas and grow much of the food they consume.\textsuperscript{27} Significant gains in raising living standards must, according to this perspective, focus on a major expansion of agronomy programs specifically tailored to small farmers, especially agricultural extension and on-farm agronomic technology support, and on industrial and social investments that aim for job growth and rises in educational and health standards within rural areas.\textsuperscript{28}

Some of the nations which have achieved the greatest recent success in regard to improving rural development indicators (in health, education, wages) and in assuring food security -- most notably Taiwan, Vietnam, China, some of the states of India, South Korea and Kyrgyzstan -- embarked on a varied mix of industrial and agrarian strategies, including the creation of a property rights system of land ownership in which peasant households register their smallholdings with the courts and spreading manufacturing centers through the countryside while strengthening rural transport and communications infrastructure. It is in this respect not a surprise that these are the very same countries which have made dramatic progress in raising rural living standards, providing a diversity of rural-based work opportunities, and retaining a large percentage of the traditional food-producing small farmer populace on the land. \textsuperscript{29}

Indeed, in bolstering small-farm agriculture while facilitating industrial growth in the countryside, it became evident, in these cases, that farming households will send family members to rural factories in order to augment household incomes. At the same time, on-farm improvements and government-provided efficiencies in farming techniques and inputs made up for off-farm temporary migration by some household members. Such migration for the purpose of industrial work increased the likelihood of farming households being able to remain on their lands, since the augmented household income enabled each family to invest in on-farm inputs and to be better assured of being able to purchase necessities in the agricultural off-season. This, for


example, is what took place in Taiwan in the 1960s, which led directly to measurable gains in rural living standards and to rises in rural income.\(^\text{30}\)

Even more dramatically in Vietnam, from the late 1980s through 2003, intensive investment in hybrid rice seed varieties led to the distribution of 142 advanced rice seed types being distributed to more than half the country’s farmers. These improved rice seeds combined with improvements in farm irrigation and insect-control programs helped to assure more than a doubling of rice production in that time period.\(^\text{31}\) At the same time, rapid progress was made in establishing thousands of new factories throughout the Vietnamese countryside, providing jobs to rural household members and expanding rural incomes significantly. Not only was food security greatly improved for the majority of Vietnamese households, but major gains took place regarding health indices and other social development indicators.\(^\text{32}\) It was precisely the combination of on-farm targeted programs aimed at keeping agriculturalists on their lands with spreading out progress toward industrialization that assured the country such impressive achievements regarding food security and rural development.

Meanwhile, a factor that is central to keeping agriculturalists on their farms so as to better assure food security and rural development is improvement in property rights regimes in the countryside. Studies make clear that when smallholders possess physical proof of land ownership (as in land tenure papers filed with a local land registry), no matter how small their plots may be, they are more likely to invest in long-term on-farm production inputs and to diversify the crops they produce so as to better assure a year-to-year range of food harvests to sell or consume.\(^\text{33}\) In China, for example, in 2009, proof of land ownership was estimated to be valued at an increase in income of more than $2,000 per farming household annually – along with better food security.\(^\text{34}\) In Vietnam, exponential rises in per-farm productivity in the 1990s was closely associated with the widespread distribution of land titles in that decade, in turn leading to impressive decreases in rural poverty and increases in rural development.\(^\text{35}\) In


Kyrgyzstan during that same decade, the post-Soviet allocation of land titles to small farmers led to a doubling of per-farm agricultural output and dramatically increased overall food security.\footnote{Kamiljon T. Akramov and Nurbek Omuraliev, “Institutional Change, Rural Services, and Agricultural Performance in Kyrgyzstan, International Food Policy Research Institute Discussion Paper No. 904, October 2004, pp. 4-5, 7, 12.}

In addition to rural land property regimes, government-provided technical supports and the spreading out of industrial investments through the countryside, the role of government-supported food producer pricing programs should also be noted. National governments that provide agronomic pricing supports enable farmers to better assure annual income gains, leads to greater overall food security, and indirectly promotes overall rural development (Giovanni Andrea Cornia, 2005).\footnote{Giovanni Andrea Cornia, “Inequality, Growth and Poverty: An Overview of Changes the Last Four Decades,” ch. 3 (pp. 3-25) in Giovanni Andrea Cornia, ed., Inequality, Growth, and Poverty in an Era of Liberalization and Globalization (Oxford University Press, 2005), pages 4, 6, 10; Jon Hellin and Sophie Higman, Feeding the Market. South America Farmers, Trade, and Globalization (Kumarian Press, 2003), pp. 64, 204-211.}

Countries whose farmers experienced major reductions in income and in the size of food harvests during the 1980s and 1990s as a result of the impact of privatization, structural adjustment-related conditionality agreements, and the related abandonment of national pricing supports would benefit most from a global return to national government-provided agronomy food crop price guarantees.\footnote{Liisa L. North, “Neoliberal Adjustment Policies and Local Initiatives,”ch.1 in North and John D. Cameron, eds., Rural Progress, Rural Decay (Kumarian Press, 2003): 1-22, pages 1-4, 14.}

**Rural Social Capital**

To be sure, rural development and food security is not only the result of top-down national government policy programs, but also reflects the sociological integrity of rural society at the grassroots – referring here to already-existing, inter-household social support systems in place in many rural regions. The more that already-existing ‘social capital’ is functional and effective, the better chance that agricultural and rural development policies can be crafted that prove workable. This is in part because villagers embedded in local social, economic and informational networks are more likely to share newly acquired technical knowledge, information about access to inputs, price-related information, and so on, facilitating a more society-wide impact of economic development inputs. With historically entrenched, knowledge-sharing and village based social networks functioning effectively, agronomic and economic development policies are more likely to take root – because an already-existing social foundation is in place and can help to assure that extension services, for example, will have a widely shared beneficial impact.

Thus, ‘syndicates’ in Botswana, community-wide social traditions in Burkina Faso, and solidarity networks in central and western Africa all enhance the ability of poor agriculturalists to survive poor harvests, to gain access to key economically useful information (regarding market outlets,
for example), and to enhance their long-term economic and food security. In doing so, they provide a societal structure that is more receptive to social development, agronomic technology and agricultural enhancement programs established by the national government. Similarly in China, those villages characterized by a ‘strong’ civil society, which typically include widespread participation in temple, church, or ethno-cultural institutions, tend to benefit most from economic development efforts in part due to the fact that local elites perceive their interests to lie in sharing externally obtained inputs with the village as a whole. In Vietnam as well, the local villages that benefitted most from rural development efforts were those whose leaders were immersed in professional and political networks that extended into local government units.

In Mali and in Tanzania, government programs aimed at improving food security worked best where local village elites were able to steer new inputs into already-existing village networks oriented around grain-growing and livestock herding. In Ecuador, the decision to marshal rural development efforts toward textile producers who in turn were closely linked to extensive village networks helped to assure that rural development gains would be widely shared. By focusing food security-enhancing programs within historically entrenched village social networks, development programs regarding potato production in Bolivia, grain-based agriculture in Guatemala, and milk cooperatives in India all generated noteworthy improvements in overall household income and in food security.

Conclusion

Looking forward, the 21st century presents certain new large-scale challenges to the successful growth models of the past, including rapid population increases; intensified global land pressures, in part related to rural privatization and to mounting market demands for biofuels;


decreasing global amounts of arable land due to climate change; and rising inequalities both within rural areas and globally. In the face of these rapidly growing 21st century contextual problems (which are already crises in some countries), development strategies that have the best chance to make progress toward national food security and rural development are those that spread industrialization investments throughout rural areas while at the same time encouraging smallholders to remain on their land plots. To do so, the provision of land titles that demonstrate land plot ownership is central to assuring that smallholders re-invest in agronomic production over the long term.

At the same time, it is crucial for national governments to provide agronomic small farmers with infrastructural supports such as agricultural extension programs, on-farm technical inputs, as well as producer pricing supports. Doing so not only leads to gains in agronomic productivity and rural food security, but also results in better overall rural development including increases in health, better job prospects for young people and overall family well-being.

This paper also suggests that rural development programs which target already-existing social capital-based networks – i.e., villages and rural regions with historically ‘deep’ and entrenched inter-household mutual support traditions and/or ethno-cultural groupings that encourage economic exchange and interpersonal trust – have the best chances of producing dramatic rural development gains. To achieve such gains and to better assure food security over the long term, it is therefore helpful to craft development strategies that reflect an understanding of local social history regarding village networks within the rural areas of a given nation-state.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT
MOVING TOWARD HUMAN RIGHTS FOR DEAF WOMEN AND GIRLS – Amy T. Wilson & Sarah Houge

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Introduction:

Imagine planning development assistance projects that unintentionally ignores a minority group consisting of 328 million adults and 32 million children. Could that actually happen? The UN Millennium Declaration (United Nations, 2000) states that we must “uphold the principles of human dignity,” especially for the most vulnerable, but have we done this? If you were to ask deaf women and girls, who make up half of this huge over-looked minority group, if development assistance strategies or humanitarian relief efforts have supported them and their needs, you would see them signing a passionate “no.” Today, I will be discussing the situation of deaf women and girls in developing countries, how the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) intends to protect their human rights and how we in the development world can best assist them in our programs and projects.

The World Health Organization (World Health Organization, 2015) estimates that 5% of the global population has a hearing loss that impacts the ability to communicate easily with others. Most likely you, a family member or a friend you know has lost the ability to hear well. Chances are, if you haven’t, you will as you age. Last month WHO (2015) stated that around 1.1 billion young people are at risk of losing their hearing and about 180 million have damaged hearing as a result of excessive noise by setting their head phones and earphones volume at high levels, for example, or going to venues with loud music.

In the United States, deaf people are protected and supported by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 so it’s common to see American Sign Language (ASL) interpreters on TV or at meetings and public events. ASL is the third most-used language in the US and many high schools offer it as a foreign language credit so it has become common place to see people signing in public.

If we investigate where most people with hearing loss live in the world, we’d see that eighty percent of all deaf and hard of hearing people live in economically poor countries where their deafness may be caused by factors such as genetics, infectious diseases, chronic ear infections,
high fever, ototoxic drugs, maternal rubella, low birth rate or accidents (World Health Organization & World Bank, 2011). Sign languages in those areas are most likely not as common to see in the public as in the US. In fact, deaf people, in particular, suffer discrimination and oppression in their home countries where signing is not encouraged or accepted. Social services, if available, focus more on fixing a deaf person’s hearing “loss” with hearing aids, cochlear implants, or years of speech lessons.

Although the hearing world labels deaf people “disabled,” many deaf people contend that they are a linguistic minority belonging to a unique cultural and linguistic community which has its own social norms (All-Russian Society of the Deaf, 2015). Deaf leaders state they are put in a disabling position by an unaccommodating non-signing environment that does not accept or recognize their Deaf culture. Deaf people can access their world with appropriate support such as sign language interpreters, the captioning of movies and television, and special technology (siren alarms that also flash, for example), bilingual education (spoken and signed languages in schools) and teachers who are fluent in sign language and trained to teach deaf and hard of hearing children.

The World Federation of the Deaf (WFD) is the international non-governmental organization recognized by the United Nations as representing deaf people worldwide. WFD (2009) found in a survey of 93 countries that,

“... relatively few countries deny Deaf people access to education, government services or equal citizenship on the basis of deafness alone. But the lack of recognition of sign language, lack of bilingual education, limited availability of sign language interpreting services and widespread lack of awareness and knowledge about the situation of Deaf people deprive most Deaf people of access to large sections of society. Thus they are not able to truly enjoy even basic human rights” (Hauland & Allen, 2009, p. 7).

WFD (Nilsson, 2013) also noted the paucity of data about the lives of deaf people, but especially about deaf women and girls in developing countries (United Nations, 2015). Only ten percent of children born deaf have parents who are also deaf (Mitchell & Karchmer, 2004). They are fortunate as the family accepts them as “normal” and they immediately have a visual language they can easily learn to use. Ninety percent of deaf children have hearing parents who do not know sign language and communicate through speech, a means which is inaccessible to a deaf child. For deaf girls, they can be treated differently according to what myths or beliefs may exist about why they are deaf – were they given the evil eye? Paying for past sins from another life? Being punished by God? Being blessed? Deaf women and girls may confront social stigmatization and exclusion from family and community life as a result of “being different” and their right to be wives and mothers could be in jeopardy just because of their deafness (Wilson, 2009).
**Education of Deaf Children**

We do not know exactly how many deaf children attend school but we do know that estimates state that only 1-3% of children with disabilities attend school (United Nations, 2015). When deaf girls do attend school, they most likely will not have a sign language interpreter, teachers who communicate in sign language or who have a pedagogical background for teaching deaf and hard of hearing children. If deaf women and girls don’t attend school and are unable to communicate in the spoken language or are not literate, and if no one is able to interpret their ideas and thoughts in sign language, then opportunities afforded to hearing people are shut out to them. Without language access, deaf women and girls are excluded from education and job training, and have limited social contacts. Often the community will have low expectations of the deaf girls which they then internalize themselves. Lack of language access means deaf women are excluded from political and legal processes, from basic healthcare, and because of their “disability,” become the lowest priority for limited resources such as food, clean water, and inheritable land.

For deaf women and girls, these barriers all result in less social capital, fewer employable skills, inability to assert their rights, poor health, lack of employment, and dependency on those around them. Deaf women have higher rates of violence against them than non-disabled women and struggle with communication if they try to get help (Mertens, Wilson, & Mounty, 2007).

**Sign Language and Human Rights**

WFD believes the use of sign language is a fundamental human right which then makes it possible for deaf people to achieve all other human rights. Recognition and use of sign languages, recognition and respect of Deaf culture, a bilingual education (sign language and the spoken national language), sign language interpretation and access to all areas of society and life supported by laws that prevent discrimination and fair citizenship are basic factors needed to achieve human rights for deaf women and girls.

“The status of sign language varies in each country, therefore, the legislators and governments understand the roles of sign languages in different ways. In some countries the rights of Deaf people to education and equal participation in the society are secured by legislation. In others it is forbidden to use sign language even in class rooms. A deaf person’s access to sign language and belonging to a Deaf community should not be denied or ignored by governments” (World Federation of the Deaf, 2015).

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) do not mention “disability,” or “persons with disabilities” or “deaf and hard of hearing,” but throughout the MDGs’ existence, the international development community has been made aware of the need to be inclusive. Disability and Deaf leaders advocated for a human rights instrument to protect their rights and over the course of five years, wrote the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD) that opened for signature in 2007. WFD participated in the crafting of the CRPD and you can note that sign language rights are mentioned throughout the articles (United Nations, 2006). For example:

**Article 9: Accessibility**

e) To provide forms of live assistance and intermediaries, including guides, readers and **professional sign language interpreters**, to facilitate accessibility to buildings and other facilities open to the public;

**Article 21: Freedom of expression and opinion, and access to information**

States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities can exercise the right to **freedom of expression and opinion**, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas on an equal basis with others and through all forms of **communication of their choice**, as defined in article 2 of the present Convention, including by:

e) **Recognizing and promoting the use of sign languages.**

**Article 24: Education**

3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures, including:

b) Facilitating the learning of **sign language** and the promotion of the **linguistic identity of the deaf community**;

c) Ensuring that the education of persons, and in particular children, who are blind, deaf or deafblind, is delivered in the **most appropriate languages and modes and means of communication** for the individual, and in environments which maximize academic and social development.

4. In order to help ensure the realization of this right, States Parties shall take appropriate measures to employ teachers, including teachers with disabilities, who are **qualified in sign language** and/or Braille, and to train professionals and staff who work at all levels of education. Such training shall incorporate disability awareness and the use of appropriate augmentative and alternative modes, means and formats of communication, educational techniques and materials to support persons with disabilities.

**Article 30: Participation in cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport**

4. Persons with disabilities shall be entitled, on an equal basis with others, to recognition and support of their **specific cultural and linguistic identity, including sign languages and deaf culture.**

The CRPD protects the rights of deaf and hard of hearing people who use or do not use sign language to have access to information and communication in the modality that is most effective for them.

Traditionally, the development assistance community created special projects for deaf women
and girls but their minority status and modest numbers usually meant that assistance was infrequent. Article 9 of the CRPD assures that deaf women will be included and accommodated in programs targeted for hearing women in their community; for example, including deaf women in a maternal health care program instead of waiting for one to be designed for them, if ever.

Assistance has also focused on “fixing” rather than “including” deaf women and girls. Hearing aids are helpful for some deaf people, and it is a kind gesture that organizations bring them overseas to be provided to the deaf community. However, if you ask deaf people what they truly want, they will tell you that they want an education, jobs, interpreters, and not to be “more hearing.”

Successful development assistance includes the deaf stakeholders in the planning, implementation and evaluation of programs. Ideally, development organizations should have deaf experts to team with deaf women overseas. At Gallaudet University, Dr. Amy Wilson and I teach in the international development graduate program and have worked diligently to insure that development assistance organizations understand that hiring a deaf professional would require minimal accommodation and will result in notable improvement in projects and programs. The InterAmerican Development Bank hired a Deaf Canadian development expert to meet with Deaf South Americans who successfully created a sign language curriculum for deaf children now used by thousands. A South African university sent a Deaf evaluator to interview Deaf community members about the accessibility of HIV materials and the effectiveness of the local health clinic. Several years ago, I worked with the Ministry of Education in Bhutan focusing on improving the education for deaf and hard of hearing people in the nation. This consultancy was their first experience working with an expert trained in Special Education who was Deaf and fully used sign language. At first, they were naturally concerned about accommodating me but by the end of my consultancy, they emphasized the benefits of having a Deaf Consultant with my unique understanding of this population- they truly felt that made a significant impact on improving their educational programs. Deaf collaboration is essential for effective and sustainable programs.

Without the right to appropriate education or access to employment, deaf women and girls are effectively denied the right to become independent and contributing members of society. In order to improve the quality of life for deaf women and girls, we need to see their families, NGOs, faith-based organizations, governments, intergovernmental organizations, regional, international financial institutions and society as a whole:

b) understand the issues surrounding communication for deaf women and girls and their language rights,

c) include deaf women in the design of strategies and plans, especially ones concerning them,

d) support cooperation between all development organizations to ensure inclusion, equalization and accessibility for deaf women and girls.
e) incorporate the perspective of deaf women in development cooperation and development finance activities,

f) collect accurate and valid data about all aspects of deaf women and girls in order to assist and monitor them (e.g. educational level, socio-economic status),

g) create national programs, policies and strategies for including deaf women and girls,

h) Increase and improve the support services available (interpreters, trained teachers) that promote the economic and social acceptance, inclusion, and empowerment of deaf women and girls in their homes and national communities.

Do you have any deaf women working in the field of international development with you in the US or overseas? Are your projects inclusive of deaf women and children, or any deaf people for that matter? If you do have any projects in place for deaf women, were they a part of its design or management? Do you know how to uphold the CRPD which has been ratified by 152 countries? Write to us to learn more about how you can include deaf women and girls in development assistance work. In addition, governments, global leaders, policy-makers and other stakeholders must continuously be supported by you and your organizations in their efforts to be inclusive of deaf women and girls in their programs.
Bibliography


The Inaugural Conference on International Development was jointly organized by the School of Public and International Affairs and the Center for Democracy and International Affairs at Virginia International University. The Conference on International Development seeks to identify emerging issues and new conceptual debates in the development community and explore the latest ideas, innovations and best practices in the field. The 2015 conference focused on how developmental strategies have changed and how they were likely to change in the near future, especially considering discussions on the United Nations new 2015 development goals. What are the barriers to achieving the Millennium Development Goals and how will shrinking development budgets contribute to greater global insecurity? Within this context, the Conference on International Development’s goal of analyzing recent trends, identifying emerging approaches, and proposing new solutions is even more pressing and urgent.

The School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA) at Virginia International University is dedicated to providing students with an excellent, rewarding, and multifaceted educational experience. The analysis and practice of governmental and international affairs in the 21st Century requires a multidisciplinary and complex approach, combining knowledge from the social sciences, policy studies, business administration, economics, computing technologies, and the sciences. SPIA programs are designed to incorporate key elements of these disciplines into a multidimensional and academically challenging program that prepares students to be problem-solvers in today’s demanding public arena. The SPIA offers two programs, a Master of Science in International Relations (MIR) and a Master of Public Administration (MPA). The MIR program offers two concentrations: International Economic Development and International Business. The MPA program offers three concentrations: Public Management, Information Systems, and Health Care Administration and Public Health. The programs are offered both on-campus and partially online.

The mission of the SPIA Center for Democracy and International Affairs (CDIA) is to promote global understanding of democratic governance as well as to establish an international dialogue for cultural, political and economic exchange to aid in resolution of current international challenges. The Center was established to explore contemporary and historical issues associated with democracy, liberty and international affairs. The Center provides a forum for presentations by government officials, journalists and scholars; publishes scholarly writings on subjects of governance and international affairs; encourages and supports public participation in political processes; and engages VIU students and faculty in study and research on related subjects.